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Abstract
A long line of literature argues that income taxes do not tax the return to risk bearing.
The conclusion, if correct, has important implications for the choice between an income
tax and a consumption tax and for the design of income taxes. The literature, however,
on its face seems unrealistic because it models only very simplified tax systems, assumes
perfect rationality by individuals, and requires the government to take complex positions
in securities markets to hold in equilibrium. This paper examines the extent to which
these problems affect the conclusions we draw from the literature. It argues that the
criticisms are overstated. Moreover, the criticisms do not detract from the central value
of the models, which is to understand ideal income taxes, which are the purported goal of
most who support an income tax.
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The (Non)Taxation of Risk
David A. Weisbach*
January 12, 2004
The singular feature of an income tax is that it imposes a tax on capital income.1 It
is this feature that distinguishes an income tax from wage or consumption taxes. A tax on
capital income, and hence an income tax, is thought by many to be desirable for fairness
and distributional reasons. Individuals who do particularly well in the market can afford
to pay more tax and rightly share a higher burden of the cost of government because of
their increased wealth. Moreover, the tax on capital income is responsible for most, or
even substantially all, of the complexity of the current income tax, which means we must
believe strongly in its value for it to be worth retaining. Given the large stakes, there
have been long and heated philosophical debates about the merits of taxing capital
income.2
There is a line of literature arguing, however, that the debates over the taxation of
capital income are based on a false belief. Income taxes, the literature argues, do not tax
most returns to capital.3 This is not because of loopholes or implementation problems –
*

Professor, University of Chicago Law Scho ol. I thank B ob G reen, L ouis K aplow, and particip ants
at the Harvard Law S chool tax colloquium and wo rkshops at C hicago and Toronto for co mments.
1

For example, an ideal Haig-Simons tax taxes individuals on the change in value of their assets in each
period. If an individual’s assets go up in value, she owes tax, producing a tax on capital income. See Robert
M. Haig, The Concept o f In co me – E co no mic and Legal A spec ts, in The Fe de ra l Income Ta x 1 (R obert M.
Haig ed. 1921), reprinted in Am. Econ Ass’n, Readings in the Economics of Taxation 54 (Richard A M usgrave
& C arl Sho up, ed s., 195 9); H enry C. Simo ns, Persona l Incom e Taxation 50 (1938).
2

The debate goes back at least to Hobbes. See T. H obbes, The Leviathan 298. Contributors include
such philosophers as John Stuart Mill and John Rawls and economists such as Adam Smith, A.C. Pigou,
Nicholas Kaldor, and Irving Fisher. See John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Book V, ch. II, §4;
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 278-79; Ada m Sm ith, Wealth of Nations, bk. 5, chap.2, pt.2; A.C. Pigou,
A Study in Public Finance 118-26 (3d ed., 1951); Nicholas Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax (1955); Irving Fisher
& H. Fisher, Constructive Income T axation (1942). The debate continues into modern times. See, e.g., W hat
Should be Taxed, Income or Expenditure? (Joseph Pechman, ed. 198 0); W illiam Andrews, A Co nsumptionType or Cash-Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113 (1974); Alvin Warren, Jr., Would a
Consumption Tax be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 Yale L. J. 1081 (1980); Robert Hall & Alvin Rabushka,
The Flat Tax (2d ed. 1995).
3

See, e.g., E.D . Domar, & R.A. Musgrav e, Pro portional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, 58
Quarterly Journal of Economics 388 (1944); James Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior T owards Risk, 25
Review of Economic Studies 65 (19 58); J. Mossin, Taxation and Risk-Taking: An Expected U tility Approach,
35 Economica 74 (1968); Joseph Stiglitz, The Effects of Income, Wealth, and Capital Gains Taxation on RiskTaking, 83 Quarterly Journal of Economics 262 (1969); Agnar Sandmo , Portfolio Theory, Asset Demand, and
Taxation: Comp arative Statics with Many Assets, 44 Review of Economic Studies 369 (1977); Jeremy Bulow
and Lawrence Summers, The Taxation of Risky Assets, 92 Journal of Political Economy 20 (1984); Roger
Gordo n, Taxation of Corporate Capital Income: Tax Revenues versus Tax Distortions, 100 Quarterly Journal
of Econom ics 1 (1985); Joseph B ankman and Thom as Griffith, Is the Debate Between and Inco me Tax and a
Consumption Tax a D ebate abo ut Risk? Does it Matter? 47 Tax L. Rev. 377 (1992); Louis Kaplow, Taxation
and Risk-T aking: A General E quilibrium P erspe ctive, 47 N ational Tax Jou rnal 13 5 (1994 ); Alvin W arren, Jr.,
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the arguments apply to ideal income taxes. The reason is that capital income is mostly a
return to bearing risk, and individuals, even in a Haig-Simons system, can, and will,
eliminate the tax on this type of return. To illustrate, suppose that in a world without
taxes, an individual would bet $100 on a coin flip (representing pure risk). If the
individual is subject to a 50% tax, the bet becomes a $50 bet. By doubling his bet to
$200, however, the individual can be back in the same place even after taxes are imposed.
Therefore, the individual is completely indifferent between the worlds with and without
taxes because his payoffs are unchanged. All that is left of capital income to be taxed is
the risk-free or pure time value return. This amount, however, is historically very low,
which means that notwithstanding initial understandings, income taxes tax very little
capital income.
If this conclusion is true – if income taxes do not tax returns to risk bearing – it has
the potential to completely change our understanding of taxation. If a Haig-Simons
income tax taxes only the risk-free return, it effectively does not tax capital because the
risk-free return is historically close to zero.4 Therefore, a Haig-Simons tax is basically
the same as a consumption tax (which imposes a zero rate of tax on capital), and the
debate between the two tax bases is not particularly meaningful. The decision might best
be made on administrative grounds rather than on deep philosophical arguments about the
proper distribution of the tax burden.5
Similarly, proponents of income taxes argue that income taxes are particularly fair
because they tax winners more than losers.6 Think again of the coin flip. The winner
pays a 50% tax on his winnings while the loser deducts his losses. If we believe the
taxation and risk literature, this fairness argument is false. The returns to risk-bearing are

How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax is Exempt under a Cash Flow Tax, 52 Tax L. Rev. 1
(1996); James Poterba, Taxation, Risk-T aking, and H ousehold Portfolio B ehavior, in 3 H andboo k of Public
Economics 1110 (Alan Auerbach and Martin Feldstein eds. 2002); Noel Cunningham, 52 Tax L. Rev. 17
(1996); David Weisbach, Taxation and Risk-Taking with Multiple Tax Rates, forthcoming, National Tax
Journal 2004.
4

I will qualify this statement some what in S ection I.D. below. In particular, if an ind ividual has a
limited opp ortunity to make a profit abo ve the normal pro fits available in the market, income taxes will tax this
amo unt. Consumption taxes, however, also tax these so-called inframarginal returns. Therefore, the taxation
of inframarginal returns shou ld not play a role in distinguishing between incom e and co nsumption taxes.
5

See Bankman and Griffith, supra note 3; William Gentry and R. Glenn Hubbard, Distributional
Implications of Introducing a Broad-Based Consumption Tax, in 11 Ta x Po licy and the Economy (James
Poterba ed. 1977); William Gentry, and R. Glenn Hubbard, Fundamental Tax Reform and Corporate Financial
Policy, in 12 Tax Policy and the Econom y (James Poterba ed.199 8).
6

Michael Graetz, Implem enting a Pro gressive Consumption T ax, 92 Harvard L. Rev. 1575, 1601
(1979) (“Circumstances m ust be considered as similar only after results are known; lucky gamblers are not the
same as unlucky gamblers.”).
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not taxed at all under an income tax, so winners are taxed exactly the same as losers. The
goal of taxing winners more than losers does not support an income tax.
There are also a number of implications about the design of an income tax,
assuming we are going to have one. For example, if we are only going to tax the risk-free
rate of return to capital, there are a variety of ways of doing so that might be much
cheaper to administer than a Haig-Simons system. We might be able to achieve identical
efficiency and fairness goals at a lower cost. And the effects of taxing inflationary returns
become more important. If we thought we were taxing the full return to capital, taxing
inflation may not change the overall results very much because inflation will often be a
low percentage of the full return. But if we are only taxing the risk-free return, inflation
looms larger. Inflation may well equal or substantially exceed the risk-free return, and
taxing inflationary returns may increase effective tax rates dramatically. Finally,
measurement of capital income is difficult and expensive. If only the risk-free rate of
return is taxed, crude measurements may be preferable to more expensive but more
accurate measurements because the efficiency losses from crude measurements may be
small.
The taxation and risk literature and the conclusions that follow from it, however, do
not appear to have been widely accepted. Legal scholars still advocate for an income tax
over a consumption tax (on grounds other than administrative grounds)7 or over superior
means of collecting a tax on the risk-free rate of return. Economists modeling the
efficiency losses from income taxation almost uniformly assume that the full rate of
return is taxed.8 Studies of the distributional impact of income and consumption taxes
similarly assume that the full rate of return to capital is taxed. Standard texts in tax policy
and public finance either ignore or give short shrift to the literature.9 And there are fierce

7

See, e.g., M ichael Graetz, 10 0 M illion Unnecessary R eturns, A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System,
112 Yale L. J. __ (2002). One could, of course, understand and believe the taxation and risk literature and still
argue for an income tax, but I’m not aware that anyone advocating for an income tax has taken this approach.
8

See, e.g.,Don Fullerton and Andrew L yon, Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital, in 11 Tax Policy
and the Econ omy (James P oterba ed ., 1997); Don F ullerton and Y olanda H enderso n, The M arginal Exce ss
Burden of Different Capital Tax Instruments,79 Review of Economics and Statistics 435 (1989); Jane Gravelle,
Effects of the 1981 Depreciation Revisions on the Taxation of Income from Business Capital 35 National Tax
Journal 1 (1982); Jane G ravelle, The Economic Effects of Taxing Capital Income (1994).
9

I am not aware of any tax policy boo k in the legal literature that even men tions the issue. See, e.g.,
Caron, Burke, and McCouch, Federal Income Tax Anthology (1997) (broad tax policy anthology with no
mention of the issue); McIntyre, Sander, and W estfall, Readings in Federal Taxation (2d ed. 1983) (same);
Philip Oliver, Tax Po licy, Readings and M aterials (2d ed. 2004 ) (same). The major public finance treatises tend
to briefly describe the results of the literature (sometimes incorrectly) without mentioning any of the
implications. See, e.g., Gareth Myles, Public Economics, (1997) at 214-219; Raghbendra Jha, M ode rn Pu blic
Economics (1998) at 224 -228. T he most recently published public finance treatise does not mention the issue.
See Richard Tresch, Public Finance, A Normative Theory (2002). An important economics b ook entirely
devoted to the taxation of capital income, fails to mention the issue. See Jane Gravelle, The Eco nom ic Effect
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debates in public forums on whether or the extent to which capital income should be
taxed.10
Because there has been no article or commentary arguing that the literature is
flawed, we are left imagining the reasons why it has not been accepted. Part of the reason
might be style – the literature tends to be mathematical and to some extent counterintuitive, which makes it inaccessible to many. I will try to remedy some of that here, but
ultimately, it takes some slogging to understand the key points.11
There might also be reasons more related to the merits. In particular, the models
used in the literature are highly simplified abstractions of the real world. The tax system
in most of the models is a perfect Haig-Simons tax. Individuals in the models adjust
rationally to the tax in a zero transactions costs world. Moreover, for the conclusions of
the models to hold in equilibrium, the government arguably must adjust its portfolio
behavior in a precise fashion. The actual tax system, however, is not a perfect HaigSimons system, individuals do not necessarily react rationally or live in a zero
transactions costs world, and the government does not appear to adjust its portfolio in any
particular manner in response to taxation. The models are triply idealized. It is, most
likely, for this reason that the conclusions of the taxation and risk literature have not had
a significant impact.
This paper examines the taxation and risk literature to determine the extent to
which it should matter in our thinking about tax systems. The models are correct within
their assumptions, so the key question is whether the assumptions are realistic, and to the
extent they are not, how real world deviations from the models affect the conclusions.12
I will draw two conclusions. First, the models are not as unrealistic as they might
seem at first. This is particularly true with respect to individual behavior, where it is easy
to misinterpret the types of adjustments and calculations required by the models. All that
is required for the models to hold is that individuals choose their investments based on
after-tax prices. Second, and perhaps counter-intuitively, it does not matter very much to
the conclusions we draw from the models that they are unrealistic. The models teach us

of Taxing Capital Income (1994 ). The Handb ook of Public Econo mics fairs somewhat better, with parts of
two chapters focused on the issue. See, Handboo k of Public Economics (M artin Feldstein and Alan Auerbach,
eds.) (2001) (Chapter 5 by Agnar Sand mo and C hapter 17 by James Po terba).
10

E.g., Debates over the growth of IRA’s. Also, Norquist interview in ABA new sletter outlining
scheme to move to a consump tion tax. Debates over the Flat Tax.
11
12

For relatively easy introductions to the literature, see Warren, supra note 3; Kaplow supra note 3.

The only other paper that I know of that considers these issues is Deborah Schenk, Saving the
Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 Tax L. Rev. 423, 42 8-43 5 (1999 -200 0). M uch of Schenk’s ana lysis is
consistent with the analysis here.
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about the Haig-Simons ideal and therefore teach us about the claimed goal of many tax
scholars. Because reform proposals are based on goals such as the Haig-Simons ideal,
understanding the goals can have real consequences. In fact, we would not want to
modify the models to reflect the real world because they would then cease to teach us
about the Haig-Simons ideal.
To preview the analysis, consider all three types of idealizations mentioned above.
First, current law is far from the ideal Haig-Simons tax in the models. Those who believe
in Haig-Simons taxation presumably would prefer if the deviations from Haig-Simons
under current law were removed. It may not be possible to have an ideal, Haig-Simons
income tax, but income tax advocates presumably would choose one if they could. Few,
for example, would prefer a realization-based tax with loss limitations and no inflation
adjustments to a perfect Haig-Simons tax if administrative costs were low.
The taxation and risk models teach us, however, that a perfect Haig-Simons system
is pretty much the same as a consumption tax, a wealth tax, or similar reforms. Many of
these reforms, particularly a consumption tax, may be attainable. In fact, the models tell
us that it is very likely that moving to a consumption tax would move us closer to the
idealized Haig-Simons tax than any likely reform of current law would. Therefore,
proponents of Haig-Simons taxation should be advocating for a consumption tax! The
argument goes the other way too. Switching to a consumption tax may be too difficult.
Proponents of a consumption tax, therefore, might want to consider perfecting the current
income tax as a way of getting close to their ideal. The taxation and risk literature
teaches us about the ideals we hold and in doing so, converts purportedly deep arguments
about the appropriate tax base into arguments purely about administrability. It is
irrelevant for this purpose that they do not model the actual tax system.13
The second deviation from the models is that individual behavior may not be as
described. People may not adjust for any variety of reasons, including the computational
complexity of the adjustments, transactions costs, and psychological problems with
understanding the effects of taxation. This is a very common assertion in conversations
one has about the models (although, again, I am not aware than anyone has systematically
explored this in writing so we cannot be sure what the actual objections are).
There are a number of problems with the claim that individuals do not adjust. First,
a claim that individuals do not adjust implicitly adopts the no-tax world as the status quo
and assumes that individuals make adjustments from there to offset the effect of taxation.

13

Schenk, note __, argues that when the taxation and risk literature is applied to the actual tax system
or any feasible realization-based income tax, the results are arbitrary. S he co ncludes, therefore, that we sho uld
not impose an income tax and instead should impose a combination of a consumption tax and a wealth tax.
Although I do not consider here how risk is taxed under current law, Sc henk’s conclusion tha t risk is unlikely
to be taxed in a coherent fashion under current law see ms likely to be co rrect.
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This is how the models themselves are presented. The adjustments can seem large and
complex from this perspective, and perhaps this is why they seem implausible.
For individuals to fully adjust to taxation, however, all they need to do is make
investments based on after-tax returns. If they do so, they will have implicitly made all
the calculations and adjustments implied by the models without ever having been aware
of doing so.14 Characterized this way, the taxation and risk literature seems more
plausible and the claim that individuals do not adjust less so. The “no adjustment”
position effectively assumes that individuals respond to pre-tax prices and, it is not
obvious why we should generally believe that individuals predominantly respond to pretax prices rather than the actual prices they face, which are the after-tax prices.
Second, the assertion that individuals do not adjust is contrary to standard assertion
that a cash flow tax imposes a zero rate of tax on capital. For a cash flow tax to impose a
zero rate of tax on capital, individuals must make the very same type of portfolio
adjustments predicted in the income tax and risk literature (and the government must
similarly adjust its portfolio). It is, however, uniformly and unquestioningly assumed by
both the legal and economics profession that a cash flow tax imposes a zero rate of tax on
capital.15 Either that conclusion must be dropped, we must agree that individuals adjust
their portfolios under an income tax, or we must find a way of distinguishing the two
cases (which I believe cannot easily be done).
If we get beyond these initial difficulties with the “no adjustment” position and
assume that individuals do not adjust their portfolios in response to taxation, the
conclusion should not be that the models are not important. Quite the opposite. If one
views the pre-tax world as the baseline, a Haig-Simons system requires portfolio
adjustments to offset the nominal tax on risk. The models show that individuals will
want to make these adjustments. If individuals cannot do so, perhaps we should move to
a tax where we get the same result as the ideal Haig-Simons tax but where individuals do
not have to make these calculations and portfolio adjustments. For example, a wealth tax
might not create the incentive to make portfolio adjustments that an income tax does. If
people behave in response to pre-tax prices and returns, a wealth tax might be preferable

14

The reason the models start with a pre-tax return and show how adjustments can be made to keep
that the sam e is to sho w equivalence be tween tax systems. They should not be read as implying that individuals
have to calculate the adjustments based on pre-tax prices.
15

The literature citing this proposition is too vast to list. The original statement is due to E. Cary
Brown. E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxa tion and Investment Incentives, in Income, Employment and
Pub lic Policy: Essays in Honor o f Alvin H. Hansen 300, 301 (19 48). Other examples include William
Andre ws, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 Harv. L. R ev. 1113 (1974); Daniel
Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of Money,” 95 Yale L.J. 506 (1986); Michael Graetz,
Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1575 (19 79); David Bradford, Untangling the
Income Tax at 67-68 (1986). T he proposition is standard in basic tax casebooks. See, e.g., Michael Graetz and
Deborah Schenk, Federal Incom e Taxation, Principles and P olicies, 2 87-2 92 (Revised Fourth Edition, 2002)
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because individuals will not have to adjust these prices and returns for taxation.16
Therefore, we might care more about the conclusions of the risk-taking literature rather
than less if individuals cannot adjust as predicted.
Very similar arguments apply to the government portfolio adjustments. The models
once again present a misleading picture of the necessary government behavior because
they compare the no-tax world to the taxed world. I have not yet even hinted at what the
government adjustments are, however, so I will leave these arguments for Section III
below.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section I will review the basic portfolio
adjustment model, using a numerical example. Section II will then discuss the potential
conclusions one might draw from the model. Section III will discuss the extent to which
the models are unrealistic and how it matters, going into detail about the differences in
real tax systems and the modeled system, in individual behavior and the modeled
behavior, and government behavior and the modeled behavior. Section IV concludes by
discussing some possible extensions of the models.
I.

The Taxation and Risk Model

The taxation and risk literature argues that individuals can and will adjust their
portfolios in response to an income tax to offset the effect of any tax imposed on the risky
portion of their returns. The intuition is that an income tax taxes gains and allows
deductions for losses, and thereby reduces the variance in outcomes from taking a bet. If
individuals wish to restore the pre-tax variance, they can just increase the size of the bet.
This section will develop this intuition through four increasingly complex examples. It
then discusses how these conclusions translate to cash flow taxation.
A. Pure, Zero-Expected-Return Bet
The simplest case is a pure bet that has a zero expected return, such as a fair coin
flip. For example, suppose that in a world without taxation an individual would bet $100
on a coin flip. If the coin comes up heads, the individual wins $100 and if it comes up
tails, the individual loses $100. We need not specify why the individual takes this bet
other than that he desires this particular risk and return.
Now suppose we impose a 50% tax on the bet. Under such a tax, if the coin comes
up heads, the individual has a $100 gain and pays taxes of $50 on that amount, leaving
16

See Schenk, note __ for a version of this argument. The models show that individuals will not make
portfolio adjustments under a wealth tax, but the models generally have only two periods. In a multiple period
wealth tax, there m ay be incentives to make portfolio adjustments but the adjustments would be smaller than
under an income tax. See W eisbach, Period ic Inco me and W ealth T axes, m anuscript. Therefore, the benefits
of a wealth tax might be smaller than they initially appear with two perio d models.
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him with $50. The government gets $50 in tax revenue. If the coin comes up tails, the
individual can deduct the $100 loss and either use the loss against $100 of other income,
thereby saving the $50 of taxes that would be due on that income, or be refunded (i.e.,
have the government write him a check for) the $50.17 Either way, the individual loses
only $50 after taxes, and the government loses $50 in forgone tax revenue. After tax,
therefore, the individual will make $50 if the coin comes up heads and lose $50 if the
coin comes up tails.
The individual prior to the imposition of the tax desired a $100 bet, but after taxes
only has a $50 bet. The individual, however, can be in exactly the same place is he was
prior to taxes by merely doubling the bet to $200. Taxes cut the $200 in half to a $100
bet, which is what our individual desires. Moreover, the individual not only can make
such an adjustment. He will make such an adjustment. The reason is that the same set of
returns are available to him in the taxed world and the no-taxed world, so he will make
the same choice. The only difference is that he must double the nominal size of his bet in
the taxed world to get that choice. Thus, if he would choose a $100 bet in a world
without taxes, he will choose the $200 bet in a world with a 50% tax.
If the individual makes a $200 bet in the taxed world, the government will receive
$100 in taxes if the coin comes up heads. If the coin comes up tails, the individual
deducts $200, which costs the government $100 in taxes. Effectively, the government
and the individual split the $200 bet on heads on a 50/50 basis. The government has zero
expected revenue from this bet because it has equal chances of making and losing $100.
The government, however, will have risk.
The government can eliminate the risk by placing the opposite bet, a $100 bet on
tails. If it places this bet and the coin comes up tails, the government receives $100 from
the bet, which offsets the reduction in taxes due to the deduction by the individual (who
lost his bet because the coin came up tails). If the coin comes up heads, the government
pays $100 on its bet, which offsets the taxes it would receive from the individual (who
won his bet).
Suppose the government wants to enter into this offsetting bet. Who would enter
into the other side? The tax system has caused our individual to want to increase the size
of his bet on heads by $100, which is exactly the amount the government wishes to
reduce the size of its bet on heads. So our individual would be more than willing to do
so. Therefore, the increase in the bet on heads by the individual is exactly offset by the
bet on tails by the government. In economic terms, it means markets clear and prices do
not change because of the portfolio adjustments.

17

In a pure, Haig-Simons income tax, individuals would get refunds for net losses during the
accounting period. Current law generally does not provide refunds, but the tax in the models is a Haig-Simons
tax.
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At the end of the day, what has happened by imposing a 50% tax on the bet?
Absolutely nothing. The individual increases the size of his bet from $100 to $200 and
pays half of the winnings to the government (or receives a payment in the case of a loss).
But if the government offsets the risk it assumed because of the imposition of the tax, it
takes the other side of the increased bet, so it pays or receives any tax revenue back to the
individual. All that the tax has done is force individuals (and the government) to adjust
their portfolios. No tax revenue is collected and no risk is shifted. The tax is a complete
nullity. The following table summarizes the positions.
No Tax

50% Income Tax

Individual
Heads

$100

$200 - $100 in taxes = $100

Tails

($100)

($200) + $100 benefit of tax loss = ($100)

Heads

$0

$100 in taxes - $100 in losses on bet = $0

Tails

$0

($100) tax refund + $100 gain on bet = $0

Government

The claim just made is that the 50% tax on purely risky returns is the same as no
tax. We should be more careful about what this claim entails. Louis Kaplow articulated
three extremely strict criteria for tax systems to be identical to one another.18 First,
taxpayers have to have the same after-tax wealth in each regime, in each state of the
world. That is, if the coin comes up heads, the individual must have the same wealth in
the 50% tax and no-tax world and similarly if the coin comes up tails. This is true – in
the case of heads, the individual has $100 in the taxed and untaxed world and in the case
of tails, the individual loses $100 in both the tax and untaxed world. Second, total (net)
investment in each asset must be the same so that we know that asset markets clear with
no price changes. This is also true. In a no tax world, the individual places a $100 bet on
heads. In the taxed world, the individual places a $200 bet on heads but the government
places a $100 bet on tails, so the net bet on heads is the same as in the no-tax world.
Third, the government must have the same revenue in each regime in each state of nature.
In the no tax world, the government obviously has no revenues. In the taxed world, the
government still has zero revenues because the tax receipts (in the case of heads) or losses
(in the case of tails) are offset by the bet on tails.
Note how restrictive these conditions are. Essentially, everybody and everything
has to be in the same place in both tax systems (in this case, the taxed and the untaxed

18

Kaplow, note 3.
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worlds) in every state of the nature. Each individual has the same wealth in all states of
the nature, the government has the same revenues, and investments are the same.
The government, of course, might not adjust its portfolio. It might like its chances
on the taxes it will receive from coin flip. It might seem, then, that the equivalence
breaks down. But the government does not need the tax system to take this bet. Instead,
it can choose not to impose a tax and instead bet directly on heads in the marketplace. If
it does so, we have exactly the same result as a tax system in which the government does
impose a tax but does not offset the risks it assumed. We can think of (i) imposing an
income tax without the government adjusting its positions as (ii) not imposing an income
tax and the government adjusting its position. The income tax becomes in this case just a
complicated, indirect, and very expensive way for the government to take market
positions.
Note that the exact same logic goes through for any tax rate. For example, suppose
the tax rate were 40% instead of 50%. Now a $100 coin flip either makes or loses $60.
To get back to the pre-tax position, the individual must bet $100/$60 = $167. Then,
when a 40% tax is imposed, the individual is left with a $100 bet. More generally, if the
tax rate is t, the individual must make 1/(1-t) times his pre-tax bet. The government
adjusts its portfolio similarly.
Finally, before moving on to the next case, it is worth considering the treatment to
the other side of the coin flip. Suppose a different individual, also subject to taxation,
enters into the other side of the bet. If the coin comes up heads, the other individual will
deduct the exact amount that the first individual includes in income and vice versa for
tails. Therefore, the government has no stake in the outcome whatsoever. The tax system
merely causes the two individuals to double the size of their transaction, leaving them
exactly the same place after taxes as before. If the individuals are subject to different tax
rates, the government will have a partial stake in the bet. If the individual betting on
heads has a higher tax rate, the government has a position in heads to that extent. If the
individual betting on tails has a higher tax rate, the government has a position in tails to
that extent. It can offset this position, as before. Therefore, the treatment of the other
side of the bet does not change the basic results and we can simply think of risk as
coming from events external to the tax system rather than from bets among taxpayers.
B. Pure Bet, Positive Expected Value
Now consider a bet with a positive expected return. Bets might have positive
expected returns because individuals will not bear risk without being compensated. So
suppose the individual betting on the coin flip now receives $120 if the coin comes up
heads but pays only $100 if the coin comes up tails. The expected return is $10. The cost
to the individual of entering into the bet is still zero – the expected return is compensation
for bearing risk.
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The results are the same as with the prior case. A 50% tax cuts the individual’s
return in half, to a gain of $60 and a loss of $50, and an expected payment of $5. The
individual can and will double the size of the bet and be in exactly the same position as
without tax.
The government’s position is similarly identical. The government exposes itself to
half the risk by imposing a 50% tax. If the individual adjusts by doubling his bet, the
government has a 50% chance of winning $120 (half of the taxpayer’s winnings of $240)
and a 50% chance of losing $100 (half of the taxpayers $200 loss). The government has
expected tax revenues of $10. Although it might at first appear that the government is
collecting real taxes in this example, it is not. Instead, the $10 of expected return is the
compensation for bearing risk and has no market value. To see this, note that the
government has exactly the same bet as the taxpayer in the pre-tax world and we assumed
that the taxpayer could enter into this bet for free. The government, therefore, can sell
this risk (for its expected value of $0) to our individual who wants to increase his
exposure in response to the tax. Once again, the tax system has no effect other than
forcing people to adjust their portfolios. The table below summarizes.
No Tax

50% Income Tax

Individual
Heads

$120

$240 - $120 in taxes = $120

Tails

($100)

($200) + $100 benefit of tax loss = ($100)

Heads

$0

$120 in taxes - $120 in losses on bet = $0

Tails

$0

($100) tax refund + $100 gain on bet = $0

Government

As before, the logic works for any tax rate. And as before, if the government
chooses to impose a tax without making a portfolio adjustment, it could equally have
chosen not to impose a tax and make a portfolio adjustment. The tax system reduces to
nothing more than the government buying and selling securities in the market.
C. Risky Investment
The most realistic case is an investment with a time value return as well as risk.
The idea will be that we can separate the risk component from the time value component
and the exact same logic will apply to the risk component – taxpayers will adjust their
bets to eliminate the effect of taxation. Because an investment requires an upfront
payment, the adjustment appears to be slightly more complex. The logic, however, is
exactly the same.
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Suppose the individual makes an investment, say of $100 for one year. The
investment has a 50% chance of being worth $130 in one year and a 50% chance of being
worth only $90 in one year. The expected amount the individual will receive is $110 and
the expected return is 10%. Assume, finally, that the individual could have alternatively
invested in a riskless asset and received a return of 4% and that the individual can also
borrow at this rate.19
We want to isolate the risky component of this investment and analyze how the
taxpayer can (and will) respond to the tax on this component. To do so, decompose the
investment into two parts. First, we can think of the individual as receiving a risk-free
return of 4% merely to reward him for investing for the year – a pure time value return.
Second, we can think of the individual as placing a bet. To get to the final values of $130
and $90 for winning and losing, he must receive an additional $26 if he wins and pay $14
if he loses. That is, if he wins the bet, he gets his $100 back, plus a $4 risk-free return,
plus a $26 risky return for a total of $130. If he loses the bet, he gets his $100 back, plus
a $4 risk-free, time value return, less a $14 loss on the bet, for a total of $90. The
expected return on the bet piece of the investment is $620 (which combined with the $4
risk-free return makes up the total $10 expected return).
An unintuitive aspect of the decomposition is that if the individual only gets $90
back, it looks like he does not get back the risk-free $4. The reason is that the investment
internally nets the $4 risk-free, time value return with the $14 loss on the bet, paying him
just the $90. By decomposing the two, we are treating the $4 as being received in all
cases but when the taxpayer loses the bet, he pays back $14. The diagram below
illustrates the decomposition.
Now suppose that the government imposes a 50% income tax on returns to all
investments. If the investment pays $130, the individual will have gain of $30 and pay a
tax of $15, leaving him with $115. If it pays only $90, the individual has a loss of $10
which he can deduct, leaving him with $95. The expected return is reduced to $5 or 5%.
The decomposition still works, using the after-tax risk-free rate of return of 2%.
The individual gets his $100 back plus a risk-free return of $2, makes an additional $13
after-tax if he wins the bet (for a total of $115, as required), and loses $7 after-tax if he
loses the bet (for a total of $95 as required). The expected return on the bet element is
now $3, the risk-free return is $2, adding to a total expected return of $5. Effectively, the
50% tax just cut everything in half. The diagram below illustrates.

19

The proofs all go through if the individual only borrows at a risky rate except that it is the
individual’s bo rrowing rate that is subject to tax . See N oel C unningham, note 3 .
20

Computed as 0.5 x $26 - 0.2 x $14 = $6
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The individual will want to adjust his portfolio in response to taxation. To increase
his position in the investment, the individual will have to come up with more cash. That
is, unlike the pure bet case, if he wants to double his investment, he will need an
additional $100. Suppose the individual borrows the $100, risk-free (alternatively, he can
sell a $100 risk-free investment) and invests the proceeds in the risky investment.
His after-tax position is now as follows. This year he invests $200, $100 coming
from the borrowing. Next year, he must pay back the $100 loan plus 4% interest. The
interest can be deducted, saving him $2 in taxes, so the total after-tax cost to him of
paying back the loan is $102. If we follow the decomposition on his investment of $200,
he gets his $200 back and a 2% after-tax risk-free return on that amount, or $4. In
addition, for each $100 invested, he also gets $13 after taxes if he wins and loses $7 after
taxes if he loses For $200, this means he makes $26 or loses $14 on the bet piece.
Overall, after taxes next year he gets $204 risk-free and pays back $102, leaving
him with $102. In addition, he has a bet with 50% chance of winning $26 and a 50%
chance of losing $14. This is exactly the same as if we did not tax the bet at all but did
tax the risk-free return. The only difference between this set of pay-offs and the pre-tax
payoffs is the reduction in the risk-free return from $4 to $2 by the 50% tax. The table
below summarizes the numbers. As can be seen in the last line, the individual is $2
worse off in all states of the world with taxation compared to without taxation. This $2 is
the 50% tax on the $4 risk-free return.
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No Tax
Year 0

Year 1

50% Income Tax

Investment

$100

$200

Borrow

$0

$100

Risk-free return

$104

$204

Pay back loan

-$0

-$102

Net

$104

$102

Risky Return

$26/-$14

$26/-$14

Overall return

$130/$90

$128/$88

The diagram below illustrates how the cash flows work with the decomposition
diagram used above.21

21

One implication of the example is that the bet piece we isolated in the investment has to have zero
present value. The reason is that the borrowing and investing activity envisioned had no effect on the individual
other than to double the bet. The net cost of the activity was zero, so the present value of the bet has to be zero.
Therefore, if derivative markets in the risk in question exist, the individual need not borrow and buy an
investment. Instead, he can eliminate the tax on risk merely by increasing his bet through a derivative. This
makes the investment case lo ok exactly like the coin flip. In addition, the borrowing rate b ecomes irre levant,
which means that the conclusions in Cunningham, note 3, would not hold.
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To complete the example, we must consider the government side.22 Suppose the
government sells the investment short. It will receive proceeds equal to the value of the
asset. Suppose it puts these in the bank, which is equivalent to saying that it invests in a
risk-free asset and also equivalent to saying it lends the money, risk-free.23 There is a
ready buyer for the investment because the individual wants to increase his investment.
There is also a ready borrower (buyer of the risk-free asset) because the individual wants
to borrow money. If the government makes this portfolio adjustment, it eliminates any
taxes on risky returns it would have received (in return for eliminating the tax losses from
deduction on the risky returns) and is left with only the tax on the risk-free rate of return.
The cash flows become complex and are laid out in the notes, but the concept is
straightforward.24 Like in the simpler cases, the net effect of the tax on risk is a nullity
except to require individuals to make portfolio adjustments. And once again, a change in

22

If we use argume nt that the bet must have zero present value, see note __ supra, the government
can offset the risk just like it could with the co in flips through the use of d erivative s. The c ash flows all wash
in the sam e way.
23

In a short sale, the seller borrows an asse t and sells it. To close the short sale, the short seller
purchases a replacement asset and returns it to the lender. If the price of the asset has gone down, the short
seller makes money because purchasing the replacement asset costs less than the short seller received on the
initial sale. If the price of the asset has gone up, the short seller loses mo ney. A short sale is, effectively, a
method of taking the opposite side of the bet from the purchaser of the asset, analogous to betting on tails when
the taxpayer has b et on head s.
24

Supp ose the individual makes a $200 investment, borrowing $100. T he government will get one half
of the $8 risk-free return, or $4. In addition, the go vernm ent will get half of the bet, o r $26 if the bet pays off
and -$14 if the bet loses. Finally, the government will lose $2 in taxes due to the interest deduction the
individual gets on the borrowing. The net position for the governm ent if it makes no portfolio ad justment is:
$4 taxes on the risk-free return to the investment - $2 on the interest deduction
+ $2 6 if the inve stment pays off - $14 if the investment do es not.
Supp ose the government adjusts its portfolio by selling a $100 risky investment short and investing in a risk-free
asset. The government will receive $100 from the short today and p ay out $ 100 to make the investment in the
risk-free asset, netting to zero this year. Nex t year, it will rece ive $1 04 fro m the risk-free investment. It will
also close the short sale. When the short sale closes, the go vernm ent will owe $104 p lus it will owe $26 more
if the be t pays off or receive $14 if the bet does not. These risky returns amounts exactly offset the taxes
received. T he net effect is as follows:
To day: $10 0 received today, $10 0 outflow tod ay.
Next year:
Taxes:
Receive $4 + either $26 or owe $14.
Owe $2 on interest deduction by individual
Risk-free investm ent:
Receive $104
Short sale
Owe $104 + either owe $26 or receive $14
Net:
$2.
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tax regimes, in this case from a tax on the nominal return to a tax just on the risk-free
return without a government portfolio adjustment is the same as no change in tax but the
government making a portfolio adjustment.
One subtlety in this last example is that the government collects real tax dollars on
the risk-free return and the individual correspondingly pays real taxes. The individual,
therefore, is poorer. Being poorer, the individual might desire to enter into a different
amount of risk. The individual might change his investments and, therefore, taxation will
affect risk bearing, unlike the assertions above. In economics lingo, there is a wealth
effect.
But compare two tax systems. One taxes the risk-free return to investments and the
other nominally taxes the entire return (a traditional income tax). There will be no wealth
difference in these two taxes because both collect the tax on the risk-free return and only
that tax. The two taxes are identical in the sense that any opportunity available under the
traditional income tax can be achieved under the risk-free return tax and vice versa.
Therefore, behavior has to be the same under both taxes and we need not worry about
wealth effects.
Moreover, the two taxes are equivalent in the sense discussed above. Taxpayers, as
just mentioned, have the same after-tax wealth under either regime in each state of nature.
The net investment is the same in each regime because in the full taxation regime, the
government’s short position in the asset and the taxpayer’s additional long position offset
(as do the positions in the risk-free asset). Finally, government revenues are the same for
the regimes. Therefore, the regimes are identical and there are no fairness or efficiency
reasons to prefer one to the other.
D. Inframarginal Returns
The last extension of the example is to suppose that the individual finds a special
opportunity that is not generally available in the market. The idea might be that not all
investments are perfectly priced, exactly compensating individuals for risk and the time
value of money. There might be unique opportunities with returns greater than the
market return. In the literature on taxation and risk these are usually called
“inframarginal returns.” To be an inframarginal investment, the return on the investment
must be above the market rate of return and the individual must not be able to invest more
in the investment due to taxation. It must be a one-time opportunity.
If the individual has an inframarginal investment, portfolio adjustments will not
eliminate the tax on the inframarginal return because additional units of the investment
(or some other investment) will have a lower return than the initial units. The investor
cannot increase his investment in the asset because of taxation so the investor cannot
offset the portion of the return claimed by the government through taxation.
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To illustrate, suppose in the investment we have been considering ($100 turns into
either $130 or $90 in one year), the investor will receive an additional $10 if he wins the
bet. Suppose, however, that he can only get this extra return on his initial $100
investment and not on any additional units he may buy. (Additional units have the
normal return of $130.) The individual, for example, might have a special but limited
business opportunity.
The portfolio adjustment will restore to the investor his original gain of $26 and
loss of $14 but will not affect this additional $10. If we think about the bet as a coin flip,
the assumption that the extra $10 is available on only the first $100 is like saying that the
investor may not enter into additional coin flips on that $10. Therefore, he cannot offset
the tax on that amount. He can enter into the additional coin flips to offset the tax on the
$26 and $14 risk, so that amount remains untaxed.
To be more explicit (at the risk of inflicting pain), suppose the individual has the
opportunity to invest $100 in an asset that will pay $140 one half the time and $90 the
other half of the time. Because of the excellent return, the individual takes this
opportunity. Any additional money invested, however, can only be invested in assets that
produce $130 instead of $140. Suppose we impose a 50% tax, and the individual follows
the strategy outlined above, borrowing money to increase his investments. The individual
borrows $100 but can only invest it in an asset that pays $130 half the time and $90 half
the time.
In the next period, if he wins his bet, he has $270 of cash ($140 on the special
investment and $130 on the normal investment), a gain of $70, and taxes of $35, leaving
him with $235. If he loses his bet, he has $180 of cash, a loss of $20, and a tax deduction
that leaves him with $190. He also owes $104 on his loan but can deduct the $4 in
interest. At the end of the day, he ends up with either $133 or $88.
We can characterize the $133/$88 return as follows. The individual receives $2
risk-free on his $100 investment, which is the after-tax risk-free rate on the investment.
In addition, the individual receives $26 if he wins the bet and loses $14 if he loses the bet.
Finally, the individual receives an $5 if he wins the bet, which is the inframarginal return
of $10, reduced by a 50% tax. These numbers add up to $133 if he wins the bet and $88
if he losses. Thus, we can say that an income tax imposes a tax on the risk-free return and
on inframarginal returns but not on returns to risk bearing. The numbers are summarized
below.
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No Tax
Year 0

Year 1

50% Income Tax

Investment

$100

$200

Borrow

$0

$100

Risk-free return

$104

$204

Pay back loan

-$0

-$102

Net

$104

$102

Risky return

$26/-$14

$26/-14

Inframarginal return

$10/0

$5/0

Total

$140/$90

$133/$88

The breakdown of these numbers might seem somewhat arbitrary but it is not. The
underlying concept is that taxes reduce the variance or spread of outcomes. Where the
taxpayer can increase his bets, he can offset that effect. Where the taxpayer cannot
increase his bets, in this case the risk-free return of $4 and the inframarginal return of
$10, he cannot eliminate the tax. Thus, the taxpayer is taxed on the risk-free return and
the inframarginal return but not on the pure return to risk-bearing.
The question is the extent to which there are inframarginal returns in the economy.
If one believes that capital markets are moderately competitive, there should be few of
such opportunities. Nevertheless, there are enormous fortunes and many of these are
unlikely solely a result of risk-taking. One possibility is that many enormous fortunes are
returns to skill or labor rather than capital but the tax system mislabels them as returns to
capital. For example, Bill Gates’s fortune is most likely a mix of luck and effort. It did
not involve substantial capital investments by Gates and, therefore, might best be
described as mostly return to labor. The same is true for Warren Buffet’s stock picking
skills.
Regardless of whether or the extent to which great fortunes are returns to labor or
are inframarginal returns to investments, the important point is that pure Haig-Simons
income taxes these returns.25 The claim that an income tax does not tax returns to risktaking does not mean it does not tax many or most of the vast fortunes held by some
individuals.

25

W hether current law does is another matter and one which I take no opinion on here.

No te also that in the general eq uilibrium mod el where the go vernm ent makes offsetting po rtfolio
adjustments, there are no inframarginal returns because the government is always supplying the additional
securities that the individual wishes to purchase.
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E. Cash Flow Tax
The major competitor to a Haig-Simons income tax is a cash flow tax. A cash flow
tax is a tax in which all cash outlays for investments are deducted and cash inflows from
investments are taxed. As will be discussed below, a cash flow tax is thought to be a
simple method of taxing consumption. Important consumption tax proposals, such as the
Hall/Rabushka Flat Tax and the Bradford X-tax are cash flow taxes.26 Traditional VATs
are also variants of cash flow taxes.27
Cash flow taxes are thought to impose a zero tax on investment. In our strict terms
of tax equivalence, a cash flow tax is equivalent to no tax. This proposition is sufficiently
well accepted that it is often called a theorem, the Cary Brown Theorem, after its
originator.28
This proposition is dependent on portfolio adjustments by both taxpayers and the
government that are similar to those under an income tax. Consider the same investment
used so far. It costs $100 and half of the time, will produce $130 and the other half of the
time, it will produce $90. Suppose that the individual is subject to a 50% cash flow tax.
Under a cash flow tax, the individual receives a deduction of $100 when the
investment is purchased. With a 50% tax rate, the deduction is worth $50. Suppose the
individual invests this additional $50 in the same asset. He can now deduct another $50,
giving him $25 more in cash. Investing this, he gets another deduction and the process
continues. At the end of the day, he can invest $200 in the asset because of the benefit of
the deduction for investment.
The $200 investment will produce either $260 or $180. Under a 50% cash flow
tax, the individual must pay 50% of all proceeds to the government as taxes. After taxes,
the individual will be left with either $130 or $90. This, of course, is the same return the
individual would have had if the investment had never been taxed at all. The individual
started with his initial $100 and after making the proper portfolio adjustments, ends up
with the same return on that $100 that he would have had if the investment had never
been taxed at all. Because the opportunity sets are the same under a cash flow tax and in
a world with no taxes, behavior must be the same.
More formally, if the individual adjusts his portfolio by increasing the amount of all
investments by 1/(1-t), he will be left in exactly the same place as if he had never been
26

See Robert Hall & A lvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax (2d ed. 199 5); David Weisbach, Does the X-Tax
Mark the Spo t, 56 SMU L. Rev. 201 (200 3).
27

28

See David W eisbach, Does the X-Tax M ark the Spot, 56 SM U L. Rev. 201 (2003).
See E. Cary Brown, note _ _.
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taxed at all. The individual will have sufficient funds to make this investment because of
the tax savings from the tax deduction allowed when the investment is made. The table
below summarizes the numbers for an individual investor.
No Tax

50% Cash Flow Tax

Time 0
$100

$100 + $100 investment due to deduction

Win

$130

$260 - $130 tax = $130

Lose

$90

$180 - $90 tax = $90

Time 1

This conclusion about a cash flow tax is well known. The point here is that it is
dependent on portfolio adjustments much like adjustments in the income taxation and risk
literature. It hypothesizes that individuals will adjust their portfolio by putting the tax
savings from the immediate deduction into more of the same investment. This additional
investment is then exactly sufficient to pay off the tax when the original investment is
sold.
The conclusion regarding a cash flow tax is also dependent on government portfolio
adjustments in exactly the same way the income tax models are. Under our numbers, the
government gives the individual $100 in tax refunds when the initial investment is made.
When the investment pays out, the government gets either $130 or $90 in tax receipts.
The cash flow tax means that the government has effectively purchased t units of the asset
where t is the tax rate. The government can offset this by shorting t units of the asset for
each unit purchased by a taxpayer, leaving it perfectly hedged and with zero cash in all
states of the world. Moreover, if the government shorts the asset and the individual
increases his investment in the asset, there is no net increase in investment in the
economy. If the government does not make the portfolio adjustments, the Cary Brown
theorem does not hold because markets will not clear. Thus, the taxation and risk-taking
literature, while largely unfamiliar, is essentially the same and requires essentially the
same assumptions about individual and government behavior as the long-familiar and
universally accepted arguments about cash flow taxation.
Finally, note that inframarginal returns are taxed under a cash flow tax. The
reasons are essentially the same as the reasons they are taxed under a Haig-Simons tax.
Individual cannot gross up at the same rate of return as the original investment. Having
inflicted sufficient pain already, I will skip the details, which are available in a variety of
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sources.29 An important conclusion from this is that both cash flow taxes and HaigSimons income taxes tax great fortunes created through inframarginal investments or
labor. The only difference between the two with respect to these fortunes is that income
taxes tax the risk-free rate of return on these fortunes while cash flow taxes do not.
II.

Implications

The taxation and risk literature, if we accept it, has potentially far reaching
conclusions. Consider the following four.
A. The Choice Between Income and Consumption Taxes
Income taxes and consumption taxes are the two most widely used tax bases in the
world. The debate over which is superior has occupied scholars for decades with no
widely accepted resolution of the issue yet. The taxation and risk literature has important
implications for this choice, and may even be decisive.30
Haig-Simons income in given period is defined as an individual’s consumption plus
change in savings in that period:
I = C + )S
Rearranging the equation, consumption in a given period is income less change in
savings.
C = I - )S
Therefore, a tax on consumption is the same as a tax on income except that a
consumption tax does not tax changes in savings. This is why we can think of a cash
flow tax as a consumption tax. A cash flow tax taxes all receipts but allows a deduction
for any savings (and inclusions for reductions in savings), which is exactly what is
reflected in the right hand side of the above equation. We can also conclude that a
consumption tax does not tax capital income because cash flow taxes do not tax capital
income (other than infarmarginal returns).
Stated this way, the choice between an income tax and a consumption tax is a
choice of whether to tax the capital income. Philosophical arguments have been made

29

30

See, e.g., Warren, note 3.
This argument has been made by Bankman & Griffith, note 5 and Gentry & Hubbard, note 5.
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both ways.31 For example, Hobbes argued that consumption taxes better reflect the
proportion of goods that individuals withdraw from the common stock32. John Stuart
Mill argued that an income tax is inappropriate because it taxes savings twice.33 Savings
come from after-tax earnings, so they have been taxed once up front. Taxing capital
income is a second tax on the same earnings. Progressives early in the twentieth century,
and egalitarians today, argued that taxing capital is the only way of redistributing
significant wealth from the rich to the poor because many wealthy have little wage
income.34 The passage of the 16th Amendment and the enactment of the income tax came
about largely because of this logic. Rawls seems to generally prefer consumption
taxation but argues that income taxation may be necessary if existing institutions are
unjust.35 Economists have debated whether taxing capital income is efficient and argue
about the distributional impact of taxes on capital.36 The debate shows no sign of
slowing.
The taxation and risk literature may solve this deep philosophical debate with
simple pragmatics. The risk-free return has historically been close to zero. All that an
income tax taxes that a consumption tax does not is this amount. Therefore, an income
tax taxes vanishingly little not taxed under a consumption tax. Notwithstanding the long
debate over the two tax bases, they are essentially the same. There would be no
significant distributional, efficiency, or fairness changes from choosing one base or the
other.37 The debate, therefore, is almost meaningless, and the decision is best made
purely on administrative grounds rather than on theoretical considerations about the
appropriateness of taxing capital.
The conclusion still follows if we focus on extraordinary or inframarginal returns to
capital. Unlike the risk-free return, extraordinary returns are likely to be highly
significant, and it may be important to tax these, both on efficiency and a fairness
31

For a gene ral overview of philosophical arguments made about taxation, see Harold Groves, Tax
Philosophers (1975).
32

T. Ho bbes, Leviathan 298 (A. Lindsay ed. 1959).

33

John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Book V., ch. II §4, at 814 (W. J. Ashley., ed,
Logmans, Green & Co. 1909 ) (1948).
34
35

See Steven W eisman, The Great Ta x W ars (2002).
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 278-79.

36

See, e.g., B. Douglas B ernheim, Taxation and Saving, in 3 Handbook of Public Economics (Alan
J. Auerbach and M artin Feldstein, eds., 2002).
37

Bill Gentry and Glenn Hubbard, have been the authors who have m ade this argument in the most
sustained fashion. See G entry and H ubb ard, Distributional Implications, note 5; Gentry and Hubbard,
Corporate Financial Policy, note 5.
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grounds. Indeed, more than merely returns to risk-bearing, it is extraordinary returns that
likely motivated progressives and continue to motivate egalitarians to argue for income
taxes. Whatever tax system we pick, the Vanderbilts and Rockerfellers of yesteryear and
the Gateses and Buffets of today should pay high taxes. Both income and consumption
taxes tax such returns, however. Therefore, however concerned we are about
extraordinary returns, they should play no role in choosing between an income tax and a
consumption tax. The only difference in the two tax systems is the risk-free return to
capital and this is close to zero.
A central piece of the consumption tax debate is the transition to a consumption
tax. The transition to a consumption tax is thought to impose a one-time tax on all wealth
in society. This would be an enormous tax. If this one time tax on all wealth is a
necessary part of consumption taxation and is not part of an income tax, our evaluation of
its efficiency and fairness will be central to the choice of the tax base. For example, even
if we otherwise do not like consumption taxation, if we view the one time tax on all
wealth as highly attractive from either an efficiency or distributional standpoint, we may
want to adopt consumption taxation notwithstanding our views on the rest of the tax.
There are several ways to show that a transition to a consumption tax can tax all
wealth. One is simply to note that all future consumption must come either from existing
capital or future wages (potentially saved and turned into future capital). To tax all future
consumption, as required by a consumption tax, we must tax both sources. Because of
this reasoning, economists have asserted that a system that fails to tax existing wealth is
not a consumption tax, by definition.38 Others have built extensive models of the tax
system based on definitions like this.39
A more technical version of the observation is to note that current law uses basis to
track savings that have already been subject to tax. In a cash flow tax, basis would no
longer matter. If we ignored existing basis accounts, we would be ignoring the fact that
much capital has already been taxed and, therefore, tax it again. Consider for example, a
retailer who purchasers $100 of canned goods when there is an income tax.40 Suppose a
cash flow consumption tax is imposed overnight and the next day the retailer sells the
goods for $101. If the income tax had been retained, the retailer would have had $1 of
gain, equal to receipts less the cost basis. A cash flow tax allows a deduction for costs
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For example, Jane Gravelle argued that “providing relief to old capital [not taxing all existing wealth]
is inconsistent with the funda men tal nature of a consumption tax.” (emphasis added). Jane G. Gravelle, The
Flat T ax and Other Pro posals: W ho will B ear the Tax Burden?, 69 T ax N otes 1517 152 1(1995 ).
39

Alan J. Auerbach and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Dynamic Fiscal Policy (1987) (defining a consumption
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when they are incurred and taxes all receipts when earned. The cash flow tax in this case,
however, would not allow a deduction for the $100 because that was incurred prior to the
tax being enacted. Instead, it would tax the retailer on the full $101, effectively imposing
a tax on the $1 of gain and the $100 of existing, already-taxed capital.
It is not clear what the rationale might be for imposing a one-time tax on existing
capital. We should not decide to do it because of a definition. And the details of the
basis accounts seems a bizarrely technical way to think about the problem – it is easy to
construct income and consumption tax systems that do not have this mismatch in basis
accounts.41
The real argument for taxing existing wealth is that it is thought to be efficient and
have good distributional consequences. The efficiency arises because it is seen as a one
time and unavoidable tax. The good distributional consequences arise because a tax on
existing capital would fall heavily on the wealthy. The potential efficiency gains are so
large that economists have argued that a switch to a consumption tax increases welfare if,
but only if, it includes the one-time tax on existing capital.42
The taxation and risk literature shows that much of the thinking on transition
between an income tax and a consumption tax is confused. The only change when we
switch between the two tax systems is that we would no longer tax the risk-free rate of
return. The two tax systems are otherwise identical. Therefore, it is hard to imagine any
efficiency reason for taxing all existing capital on the transition that would not also argue
for taxing all existing capital on a one time basis while retaining an income tax. If it is
efficient to tax existing wealth on transition to a consumption tax, it is efficient to tax it
even though we retained an income tax because the two taxes are essentially identical.
Under the technical basis argument, switching to a consumption tax effectively wipes out
existing basis. If it is efficient to wipe out basis on the switch to a consumption tax, it
should be efficient to wipe out basis under an income tax.
B. Taxation of Opportunities or Outcomes
Another important debate in taxation is whether individuals should be taxed based
on their opportunities or on their outcomes. Consider two individuals with the same
41

For the mechanics of such proposals, see, Daniel Shaviro, W hen Rules Change, (2000) at 171-196
(chapter on transition from an income to a consumption tax); Dale Jorgenson and Alan Auerbach, InflationProof Dep reciation of Assets, _ Harvard Business Review 113 (19 80).
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amount of cash. If they make different investments, they might have very different
outcomes even though they have the same opportunities. It is not clear which is the better
basis for taxation. Outcomes might seem the appropriate tax base because how well off
an individual is depends on the outcomes of his bets. As Michael Graetz said, lucky
gamblers are not the same as unlucky gamblers.43 On the other hand, opportunities might
seem the appropriate tax base. Individuals with the same opportunities can be seen as the
same.44 Taxing outcomes would discourage these similar individuals from making the
choices that they desire. Individuals with different opportunities would, of course, be
taxed differently but by taxing opportunities, we can better achieve a version of equality.
We can rephrase the argument as a distinction between ex ante and ex post taxes.
An ex ante tax determines the amount of taxes due prior to any action taken by the
taxpayer. For example, a wealth tax is an ex ante tax because it taxes the value of a
taxpayer’s investments at a given point in time even if those investments turn out to lose
money. An ex post tax bases taxes on actual outcomes. A Haig-Simons income tax is ex
post because if the wealthy taxpayer’s investments turn out poorly, the taxpayer gets a
loss.45
The difference between outcomes and opportunities or ex ante and ex post, is how
risky investments are treated. Absent risk, outcomes can be predicted from opportunities.
For example, if our two individuals with the same wealth invested in risk-free assets, they
would have the same outcomes. Only if they invest in risky assets might their outcomes
differ.
If we believe the taxation and risk literature, however, income taxes and
consumption taxes do not tax risky outcomes. Winning and losing gamblers are treated
43

Michael Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 Harvard Law Review 1575, 1601
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the same. Think again of our two individuals with the same initial wealth. Both will bear
a tax on the risk-free return on that wealth regardless of how it is invested and regardless
of the outcome of the investments. There is no difference between taxing opportunities
and outcomes within an income or consumption tax. Like in the consumption tax debate,
this means we can choose between nominally ex ante and ex post taxes based on
administrative considerations.
For example, wealth taxes and income taxes are the same under this logic.
Consider an individual with $100 who invests it in our running example (50% chance of
getting $130 and 50% chance of getting $90 in one year). If the risk-free return is 4%, a
50% income tax will impose a cost on the individual of $2, regardless of actual outcomes.
Instead of imposing a 50% income tax, we can impose a 2% wealth tax, forcing the
individual to pay the same $2 to the government. There are no fairness or efficiency
reasons to prefer an income tax to a wealth tax or vice versa and the decision should be
made purely on administrative grounds.
Similarly, Alan Auerbach has proposed a tax on income which he calls a
retrospective tax.46 Auerbach would impose a tax on an asset based on the difference
between the sales price and a fictional purchase price equal to the sales price discounted
back to the purchase date at the risk-free rate of return. Although not immediately
intuitive, the tax is equivalent to a Haig-Simons tax from an ex ante perspective. It does
not, however, have any of the valuation or cash flow problems present in a Haig-Simons
system because no tax is due until realization. Moreover, unlike a realization system, it
has no lock-in or deferral.
One might think that a potential problem with Auerbach’s tax is that even
individuals who lose money on their investments pay a positive tax, as if they had made
money. The tax is based on the amount realized less a fictional purchase price which is
always less than the amount realized. Therefore, the tax imagines that there is always
gain on an asset even if there really was a loss. Auerbach himself believed that this
presented fairness issues.47
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Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 American Economic Review 167
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If, however, there is no difference between ex ante and ex post taxes, Auerbach’s
scheme does not present fairness issues, or at least any fairness issues not present in a
Haig-Simons tax. The reason is that a Haig-Simons tax also does not tax winners and
losers differently. Even those who lose their bets pay a tax equal to the riskless return on
their wealth under a Haig-Simons tax. Therefore, if we believe the taxation and risk
literature, those who support a Haig-Simons tax should have no fairness objections to
Auerbach’s scheme.48
The one place we must be careful about ex ante taxes is if there are large
inframarginal returns. Most people agree that it is both efficient and fair to tax these
returns. An ex ante tax might miss them while ex post taxes, such as the Haig-Simons
tax and a cash flow tax, do not. Therefore, we might not be able to freely substitute an ex
ante tax for these taxes. Perhaps the intuitions about taxing winners more than losers is
related to inframarginal returns. To the extent it is, the intuition argues for certain forms
of collecting income or consumption taxes but not for one tax base over the other.
C. Accuracy and Deadweight Losses from Non-Uniform Tax Rates
Accurate measurement of income is a perpetual problem for taxes on capital such
as an income tax. They tend to be inaccurate for two reasons. First, certain types of
capital are explicitly favored. For example, the costs of intangibles is often immediately
deducted while the costs of a machine of similar value must be capitalized and
depreciated over time. Second, capital income is notoriously hard to measure. For
example, a Haig-Simons system requires annual valuations. A realization system allows
deferral and requires estimates of depreciation.
Inaccuracies in measuring capital income create inefficiencies. Ideally, all capital
income would be taxed at the same rate. If the effective rate on one type of capital
income is lower than the rate on another, the tax system will distort investment
incentives. Businesses will use more of the favored type of capital than they would
absent taxes. Estimates of the efficiency losses from differential capital taxation can be
very high.49
If, however, only the risk-free rate of return is taxed, accuracy may be unimportant.
The efficiency losses from mismeasurment should be small because the tax imposed is
small. To illustrate, suppose that the tax rate on all assets other than intangibles is 50%,
48
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but that intangibles are expensed, producing a 0% tax rate (which is roughly true under
current law). If the expected return on intangibles is 10%, one might think that the
benefit of expensing is eliminating the 50% tax on the full 10% return, or 5%. If,
however, the income tax does not fall on the returns to risk-bearing, the benefit of
expensing may be much smaller. If, for example, the risk-free return were 2%, the benefit
from expensing is approximately 1%, which is roughly the benefit from eliminating the
50% tax on the 2% risk-free return. This is only 1/5 of the benefit calculated by assuming
the tax applied to the full return.
The implications could be very important. Estimates of the deadweight loss from
capital income taxation almost uniformly assume that the full rate of return to capital is
taxed.50 These estimates may be too high by an order of magnitude. The deadweight loss
of taxation is thought to go up with the square of the tax rate.51 If the full rate of return is,
say, eight times the risk-free rate, the deadweight loss measured using the full rate of
return will be approximately sixty-four times the deadweight loss measured using only the
risk-free rate. Similarly, the government is struggling right now with the proper treatment
of self-constructed intangibles.52 It is difficult to capture these costs and estimate their
future value, but failure to do so gives them a tax advantage over other types of
investments. If only the risk-free return to capital is taxed, the advantage may be small,
and the benefits of spending resources to tax intangibles more accurately may not be
worth the benefits.
D. Inflation
If we believe the taxation and risk literature, the taxation of inflationary returns
becomes much more important than previously thought. In a Haig-Simons tax,
inflationary returns are not taxed because they do not represent either consumption or an
increase in savings. For example, if an individual has $100 now and inflation is 3% a
year, $103 next year represents the same consumption and savings opportunities. He is
no better off in any sense by having $100 now or $103 in one year. A Haig-Simons tax,
therefore, must adjust the gain or loss in any asset by inflation.
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See sources cited in note 8.
See, Harvey Rosen, Public Finance (4 th ed. 1995) at 313.
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Current law does not have adjustments for inflation.53 Inflation adjustments have
been proposed several times but never adopted.54 The reason why seems to be that
inflation adjustments are complex, particularly when applied to debt instruments (the
amount of interest deductions and inclusions must be reduced by the portion of interest
representing inflation). Another reason might be that inflation is relatively low and,
therefore, arguably unimportant. Were inflation to approach the double digit rates of the
late 1970's, the push to index for inflation might be greater.
If we believe the taxation and risk literature, even relatively low rates of inflation
might be important. The reason is that even low rates of inflation are large when
compared to the risk-free rate of return and taxing even small inflationary returns might
substantially increase the tax on capital.
To illustrate, Bankman and Griffith argue that the risk-free return during the period
from 1929 to 1989 was 0.5% and that the average rate of inflation during the same period
was 3.1%.55 An ideal, indexed Haig-Simons tax would tax the risk-free rate of return.
With a 50% rate, the tax on a $100 investment would be $0.25. If we instead fail to index
the tax system and tax the nominal 3.6% return at a 50% rate, a $100 investment would
bear a tax of $1.8. This tax exceeds the real risk-free rate of return on the individual’s
investment. In fact, it is equivalent to an income tax on real returns imposed at a 360%
rate, 7.2 times the nominal tax rate! If we were to imposes a consumption tax instead, we
would impose a zero rate. The income tax would have more than seven times the error of
a consumption tax.
If we had thought that an income tax was on the full, nominal rate of return rather
than the risk-free rate of return, however, the effects of the tax on inflation, while
significant, are not of the same order of magnitude. For example, if the full, nominal rate
of return is 10%, a 50% tax on the nominal rate imposes a tax of $5 for a $100
investment. The real return (10% - 3.1%) is 6.9%, so the tax is equivalent to a $5/$6.9
tax, or a 72% tax. This is a big increase from the stated 50% rate, but not anywhere near
the effect if only the risk-free rate of return is taxed. The reason for this effect is that
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inflation is a much larger percentage of the risk-free return than of the entire return, so the
error from taxing inflation is correspondingly higher.
If we believe the taxation and risk literature, therefore, inflation adjustments may be
worth the complexity. Inflation can cause the tax rate to significantly exceed the nominal
rate and create efficiency losses. Moreover, if we believe that inflation adjustments under
an income tax are infeasible, there are strong reasons to prefer consumption tax. A cash
flow consumption tax would come closer to measuring income than an unadjusted HaigSimons income tax!
III.

Evaluating the Models

The implications of the taxation and risk literature are dramatic. Anyone who
really believed the literature would be likely to have significantly different views on tax
policy than they might otherwise have had. Perhaps people believe the literature and the
implications have not yet been fully appreciated. But given the lack of prominence, it
seems likely that most scholars simply do not believe that the literature is relevant and the
likely reason why is that the models seem unrealistic.
The taxation and risk models are arguably unrealistic in three important ways.
First, they do not model the actual tax system. Instead, they model a hypothetical, perfect
Haig-Simons tax which differs in significant ways from the real tax system. Second, they
do not necessarily predict the response individuals would actually make to the
hypothetical tax system because there are transactions costs that may limit portfolio
adjustments, because the portfolio adjustments are so complex that individuals may not
understand them, and because individuals may not react rationally. Finally, the models
do not seem to track government behavior. Governments do not appear to adjust their
portfolios as required in the models. The taxation and risk literature models show how
hypothetical, super-rational beings would respond in a zero transactions cost world to an
imaginary tax system imposed by a fictional government.
This section discusses each of these criticisms in detail. Ideally, I would consider
each implication of the literature in light of each criticism. To keep the discussion
manageable, however, I will focus on what we learn from the literature about the
differences between income and consumption taxes, with occasional references to the
other implications where particularly relevant.
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Doesn’t Model the Actual Tax System

Potential Problem
The tax system in the models is highly idealized. Income is measured perfectly in
each period and taxed at a single fixed rate. This deviates from our actual tax system in
any number of important ways. Consider some of the major ones.
First, and perhaps most important, the actual tax system does not tax income until it
is realized.56 While the exact meaning of the realization rule is complex and in many
cases unclear, the core idea is that individuals are not taxed on an investment until it is
sold. The advantage of the realization rule is that it reduces the valuation problems and
cash flow problems in a Haig-Simons system (which requires annual valuation of all
assets and payment of tax even if the taxpayer remains invested). There are many
disadvantages to the realization rule. For example, gain and loss can be deferred until
long after they accrue. Moreover, taxpayers can choose when to realize gain or loss,
which means that the realization system creates incentives to sell loss assets and hold gain
assets, distorting investment patterns. The resulting uneven tax rates and “lock-in” and
“lock-out” problems are not reflected in the taxation and risk models.
Second, realization creates a need for host of other tax rules which distort
investment incentives. For example, gains from the sale of an asset are often taxed at a
lower rate under the capital gains rules than ordinary cash flows from the asset are
taxed.57 While the need for a special capital gains rate is disputed, the concept of a capital
gain is a creature of realization. Moreover, even without a special capital gains rate,
distinctions remain between capital gains and ordinary income because capital gains are
generally offset against basis while ordinary income is not.58 The Haig-Simons tax in the
models does not have and does not need special capital gains definitions or rates because
sales are irrelevant to the tax.
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Similarly, because of realization, the actual tax system has a number of limitations
on the use of losses. Capital losses, for example, can only be used against capital gains.59
Net losses during the year do not generate a refund of taxes as they would in a pure HaigSimons tax and instead can only be used against gains in future years. Interest deductions
are often limited.60 These loss limitations often mean that losses cannot be fully
deducted, which in turn means that losses are effectively taxed at a different rate than are
gains. If losses are taxed at a different rate than gains, no single portfolio adjustment can
offset the effect of taxation on risk. The reason is that an individual would need to adjust
his portfolio to a different extent depending on whether a return was taxed at the loss rate
or the gain rate.61
Realization also means that the tax system has to provide complex rules for the
capitalization and depreciation of expenses. The idea behind these rules it that to
measure income, expenses must be recovered over time to match the realization of
income from an investment. But the rules are highly imperfect, creating different
effective tax rates on different types of investments.62
All of these rules are complex and distort behavior. As a general matter, we can
think of them as imposing different tax rates on different types of income, but their
effects may be more subtle because they are often dependent on transactional form. The
general version of the taxation and risk models discussed above includes none of these
details of actual law.
Third, current law imposes a separate tax on corporations. The corporate tax, like
loss limitations and capital gains rates, imposes different rates on different types of
income. Income from partnerships or other non-corporate businesses is taxed at a
different rate than income from corporations. Income from redemptions of corporate
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stock are taxed at a different rate than dividends. Income from debt is taxed at a different
rate than equity. The taxation and risk literature includes none of these complications.63
Fourth, current law taxes the inflationary return to investments. For example, if an
individual buys an asset for $100 and sells it the next year for $103 when inflation is 3%,
the individual is taxed on $3 even though it represents only inflation and not gain. The
models do not include inflation at all and, therefore, model a tax on only real returns.
Finally, current law imposes graduated rates on capital income. Therefore, an
individual’s winnings, should he be so lucky as to win a bet, might be taxed at a higher
rate than the rate at which his losses are deducted, should he be so unlucky as to lose a
bet. That is, winnings might push an individual into a high tax bracket while losing
might push the individual into a low tax bracket. The losses, therefore, would be
deducted at a lower rate than the gains would be taxed. The effect is similar to loss
limitations.
The models can be adjusted to take into account some of these complexities. For
example, they have been modified to include the effect of loss restrictions, limitations on
interest deductions, and capital gains.64 Similarly, the models have been modified to
allow different assets to be taxed at different rates or different components of asset
returns to be taxed at different rates.65 Other complexities are more difficult to model.
For example, the realization rule has to be modeled as an option because the taxpayer has
the choice of realizing gains or losses. Tax rules that rely on transactional form are even
more difficult to model. Even the most ambitious models, which would probably be
highly complex and contingent on assumptions, would not capture the complexity of the
actual tax system.
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General Response
The key argument is that many tax scholars and tax policymakers view a HaigSimons tax as the best possible income tax.66 It is thought to be the most fair and the
most efficient income tax. How well the existing tax system is performing is often
measured against a hypothetical Haig-Simons system. It is almost certainly unreachable,
but it remains the desired goal.
The taxation and risk literature tells us important facts about this goal. In
particular, the literature directly illuminates what it is that advocates of income taxes
claim to want. The models show that a Haig-Simons tax does not tax returns to risktaking. Therefore, we cannot accept a Haig-Simons tax and yet reject a consumption tax
on the grounds that a consumption tax does not tax returns to risk-taking. We can reject
both taxes on this basis, but we cannot accept one and not the other. That the tax system
in the models does not resemble current law is entirely irrelevant to this argument.
Another way to phrase the argument is to note that realization and all that goes
along with it are second best. Income tax advocates would prefer a Haig-Simons system
but because of liquidity, valuation or other problems, we have a realization system.
Suppose that the taxation and risk models do not apply to the current law realizationbased system and also that it turns out that returns to risk bearing are taxed under current
law. We should not conclude that it is desirable to tax returns to risk bearing merely
because they are taxed now. Income tax advocates have a stated preference for a HaigSimons tax and in that system, returns to risk-bearing are not taxed. Given this stated
preference, any tax on returns to risk-bearing under current law should be viewed as a
flaw in current law. Just like scholars complain that realization creates deferral and lockin problems, they should also complain that realization or other aspects of current law
impose an unjustified tax on risk (if in fact this is the case).67
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The lessons from the taxation and risk literature about simpler methods of
collecting income taxes are strengthened rather than weakened by claims that the
literature does not model the current tax system. Realization, loss restrictions, capital
gains rules, and many of the other complexities of current law are justified because a
Haig-Simons tax is too hard to implement. While not ideal, they are thought to be the
closest we can come to measuring income. The models, however, show that something
close to a perfect Haig-Simons tax can be collected through mechanisms other than the
one envisioned by Haig or Simons. Moreover, many of these mechanisms do not have
the implementation flaws of the Haig-Simons collection mechanism. Therefore, we
should prefer these other mechanisms to both current law and potentially to a HaigSimons tax itself (because they would be cheaper to collect).
For example, many believe that a cash flow consumption tax would be far simpler
to implement than current law. A cash flow system eliminates the need for tracking basis
in assets. Similarly, a cash flow system would not need specific inflation adjustments
because they occur automatically.68 And a cash flow system does not create lock-in or
lock-out problems because the present value of the tax is the same regardless of when an
asset is sold. Notwithstanding these benefits, income tax advocates do not desire a cash
flow tax because they prefer the claimed fairness or efficiency benefits of an income tax
to the potential administrative savings from a consumption tax.
The models show, however, that a perfect Haig-Simons system is not that different
from a consumption tax because the risk-free return is historically low. Moreover,
income tax systems have difficulty avoiding taxes on inflationary returns. Therefore, a
cash flow system may be closer to a Haig-Simons system than is current law. For
example, suppose inflation is 3% and the risk-free return is 1%. A non-inflation adjusted

all returns to capital, including risky returns, rather than to the failed Haig-Simons method of doing so.
Such an argument would be a dramatic change in position for income tax advocates. The Haig-Simons
definition of income has long been enshrined as the goal and abandoning could not be done lightly. Mo reover,
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would be and whether those effects are desirable. There is no reason to believe that the arguments for ths
position would no t be strong, but to evaluate the arguments, income tax advocates who wish to abandon the
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income tax would tax the sum of these two, or 4%, while a consumption tax would tax
0%. An ideal income tax would tax 1%. The consumption tax is closer to an ideal
income tax than the non-inflation adjusted income tax. In fact, a cash flow system might
be closer to a Haig-Simons system than a realization-based system could ever hope to be.
The best way to impose an efficient and administrable income tax, therefore, might be to
be impose a consumption tax, and advocates of a Haig-Simons system should support a
cash-flow consumption tax! Alternatively, they might want to explore cheaper ways of
implementing an income tax, such as Auerbach’s retrospective tax.
The argument works the other way around. Consumption tax advocates might want
to argue for improving the income tax. Consumption taxes might turn out to be very
difficult to implement. For example, the transition to a consumption tax is thought to
present difficulties. Similarly, the taxation of financial intermediaries is thought to be
especially complex under a consumption tax.69 If it turns out that consumption taxes are
hard to implement, consumption tax advocates might do better by arguing for
improvements to the income tax. In either case, whether income tax advocates argue in
favor of consumption taxes or vice versa, the taxation and risk models show that the
relevant variable is administrative costs rather than efficiency, fairness or other theoretical
considerations.70
The bottom line is that the fact that models do not reflect real world does not mean
they do not teach us something about the ideals we have for the tax system and, therefore,
that they do not have real world consequences. The models can be and to some extent
have been modified to model the real tax system more closely. We might learn a lot from
such an exercise. For example, we might understand which deviations from pure HaigSimons taxation are more inefficient or unfair. There is nothing wrong and much good
that comes with a better understanding of current law. But such benefits come in addition
to the central benefit of the taxation and risk literature, which is to tell us about the ideals
we have for the tax system. The critiques that the models do not track current law do not
reduce the core value of the models. Instead, the critiques suggest avenues for further
learning, suggesting that we can learn even more from the models rather than less.
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See David B radfo rd, T reatment of Financial Services und er Income and C onsumptio n Taxes, in
Econom ic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform (H enry J. Aaron and W illiam G. G ale eds. 1996).
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Graduated Rates
The argument made so far does not fit graduated rates. The taxation and risk
models generally do not include graduated rates, and unlike realization, taxation of
inflation, loss limitations, restrictions on interest deductions, the corporate tax, and
similar problems with current law, graduated rates may be desired to introduce
progressivity into the system.71 To the extent risky returns should be taxed at graduated
rates, and to the extent the results of the models change with graduation, the models do
not tell us about the ideal income tax.
The application of graduated rates to returns to risk taking has not been explored in
the literature.72 While a complete exploration would require a separate paper, I will
outline some of the considerations here. I will make three points. First, the only type of
rate structure that makes the models inapplicable is one in which the same taxpayer is
taxed at a higher rate on gains than losses. Current law and perhaps many idealized
systems, does not do very much of this, so the models may still be largely applicable.
Second, taxing risky returns at graduated rates (in the relevant sense of making the
models inapplicable) seems unattractive. Third, graduated rates on risky returns may be
an inevitable result of attempting to tax hidden labor income at graduated rates. Any
resulting taxation of risky returns would be an undesired effect of achieving another goal
rather than a desired end itself.
Before considering these arguments, first consider how graduated rates change the
examples discussed in Section I above. Consider the simple $100 coin flip, but now
suppose that gains are taxed at a 75% rate while losses are deducted at a 25% rate.
Absent taxes, the individual would have entered into a single bet in which, if the coin
came up heads, he won $100 and if the coin came up tails, he lost $100. After-taxes and
with no portfolio adjustments, he would make only $25 if he wins and lose $75 if he
loses. Graduated rates deprive the loser of the benefit of the full tax savings from his
loss, leaving him in this example $50 worse off. There is no way to adjust the bet to
restore the pre-tax position. For example, if he doubles his bet, after-taxes he would win
71

No te that grad uated rates and progressivity are d ifferent. A tax system ha s graduated rates if
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$50 and lose $150. Graduate rates, therefore, break the equivalences described above.
The same holds true for cash flow consumption taxes.73
For graduation to affect the results concerning taxation and risk, gains from an
investment have to be taxed at a different (higher) rate than losses. Even if individuals
with higher wealth face a higher tax rate than those with lower wealth, if gains and losses
for investments made by those individuals are taxed at the same rate, they can their adjust
their portfolios to eliminate the tax on risk. Graduated rate in this sense would mean only
that the risk-free rate of return and any inframarginal returns are taxed at different rates
for different individuals. The conclusions of the taxation and risk literature, however,
would still follow – risky returns would remain untaxed. The only type of graduated rates
that potentially changes the conclusions are rate structures in which gains from a
particular investment are taxed at a different rate than losses.
It is not clear the extent to which current law does this. For individuals of sufficient
wealth, the tax rates become flat. Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, and others with dynastic
fortunes are taxed at flat rates. Even the merely wealthy, such as married couples with
taxable income over $250,000 (adjusted for inflation), are taxed at flat rates. Individuals
of moderate means may face increasing rates on gains, but most individuals of moderate
means hold large portions of their wealth in tax-exempt form through their retirement
accounts. Moreover, much wealth that is held in taxable form is often taxed at capital
gains rates, which are flatter than ordinary income rates. And much wealth is held in
corporate form and the tax on corporations is roughly flat. Although empirical work
would be necessary to confirm it, a good first approximation might be that very little
capital income is taxed at graduated rates in the relevant sense under current law.74
Taxing risky returns with graduated rates is unattractive, at least on initial
examination. Consider the coin flip discussed above. Taxing it with graduated rates
means that gains are taxed at a higher rate than losses. At the extreme, we would tax
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In cash flow consumption taxes, however, taxpayers can avoid the effects of graduation by leveling
their consumption. The reason is that the system measures consumption, and higher rates would only app ly in
periods in which consumption is high. B y leveling c onsumptio n, individ uals can assure that the sam e rate
applies over time.
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gains and disallow deductions for losses. Those who lose their bets in such a system
would be denied the benefit of deducting their losses. That is, the main effect of taxing
risky returns with graduated rates is to hurt those who are worse off. Presumably, those
in favor of progressivity and redistribution would oppose such a system. That is, if we
follow Graetz’s argument that winning gamblers are not the same as losing gamblers, we
would have the opposite rule – we would allow those who lose their bets to deduct their
losses at a higher rate than winners are taxed. Or said yet another way, those who lose
their bets would be much happier with a flat rate schedule than a graduated rate schedule.
If our goal is to help those who lose their bets, it is hard to see why we would want
graduated rates.75
Third, the best and perhaps only reason for imposing graduated rates on risky
returns is that it is difficult to separate returns to labor from risky returns from capital
investments. For example, most of the tax on Bill Gate’s fortune will nominally be
imposed on capital (such as through the sale of his stock in Microsoft) even though much
of it may be a return to labor. Warren Buffet’s stock picking gains are best described as
returns to effort rather than returns to investments, but are inevitably taxed as capital
income. If we desire a progressive tax on returns to labor we might have to impose a
graduated tax on returns to capital.
What do we learn in this case? The graduated tax on risky returns is a second best
result of the desired progressive tax on labor income. A truly ideal Haig-Simons tax,
even a progressive one, would not have such a tax on risky returns. Therefore, we should
view any tax on risk-taking because of our need to tax hidden returns to labor at a
progressive rate as a cost. We should look for other methods of taxing hidden returns to
labor that do not have this cost. The argument is then the same as the arguments made in
the previous section about realization and other second best features of current law.
To summarize, aside from graduated rates, most of the deviations in the model from
current law are irrelevant to the core lessons from the model. The reason is that the
model tells us the effects of a pure Haig-Simons tax and, therefore, tells us about the tax
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that many scholars desire. Notwithstanding that both the Haig-Simons tax and the tax in
the model are not realistic, there are important practical consequences to understanding
the equivalence. Adjusting the models to make them more realistic might tell us even
more but would only add to the value of the models. Graduated taxes on capital are the
one case where the deviations of the model from the real world might matter. The best
case for a graduated tax rates on capital is that many so-called returns to capital actually
represent returns to labor. Any resulting tax on risky returns, however, would be
undesirable.
B. Doesn’t Model Actual Individual Behavior
Potential Problem
Even if the tax system in the model resembled the real tax system. the model makes
heroic assumptions about the ability of individuals to adjust their portfolios in response to
taxation. There are at least three such assumptions.
First, the model assumes that there are no transactions costs to reallocating a
portfolio in response to taxation. This may not be true. For publicly traded securities, the
transactions costs are relatively low, but they are still positive. Given the size of the
necessary adjustments, even low transactions costs may become significant. Moreover,
many individuals have investments in illiquid assets, such as small businesses. and the
transactions costs of adjusting the size of investments in these assets may be prohibitive.
And, the tax system itself imposes an impediment to reallocation because of the capital
gains tax.
Second, the required portfolio adjustments are complex. The examples above
illustrate the difficulties with making the calculations in a simplified tax system. The
calculations in a more complex system would be even more difficult. It is possible that
individuals would not understand how to make the adjustments.
Finally, individuals may not respond rationally to the incentives imposed on them
through the tax system. The models predict that individuals will adjust their portfolios by
showing that the opportunity sets in two worlds (for example, a world with a tax on the
risk-free rate of return and one with a tax nominally on the entire return) are the same. If
the opportunity sets are the same, behavior has to be the same. But behavioral economics
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disputes this claim.76 The same opportunity set can produce different behaviors because
of framing effects, endowment effects and the like. Therefore, showing that opportunity
sets are the same is insufficient.
In fact, because of complexities like these, it is hard to know where to start when
trying to predict the behavior of individuals regarding their portfolios. They do not
diversify in accordance with accepted financial wisdom, they waste significant resources
trading securities (losing money while they’re at it), and the do not seem to take full
advantage of tax savings opportunities such as realizing losses while deferring gains.
Individual portfolio behavior seems irrational. It is arguably a heroic assumption to
believe in the face of all this irrationality that they respond to complex and subtle tax
signals in the manner predicted.
This section examines the logic behind this criticism and the limited empirical
evidence on point. I will argue that the logic behind the criticism misconceives the
models. I will then argue that even if the criticism is true, the models lose very little of
their power, although it depends on the reasons why individuals do not adjust their
portfolios.
Should we expect individuals to adjust their portfolios?
The models predict that rational individuals will adjust their portfolios in response
to taxation. They make this prediction by showing that the opportunity sets under a HaigSimons tax and under a tax on the risk-free rate of return are the same given costless
portfolio adjustments. Therefore, given a behavior under one of these taxes, we should
expect equivalent behavior under the other with portfolio adjustments to offset the change
in tax regimes.
Many seem to believe that individuals do not adjust their portfolios as predicted.77
Although we cannot be sure of the basis for the belief, one reason might be confusion
over what the models require. The models compare two states of the world. Often the
comparison is between a no-tax world and the fully-taxed world. Alternatively, as
suggested above and in some of the literature, we can compare a fully taxed world with a
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world with a tax only on the risk-free rate of return. Regardless, individuals make large
portfolio adjustments when they switch between the worlds.
The intuition that individuals do not adjust might arise because we never see
individuals making these large adjustments. Because we rarely go from the untaxed to
the taxed world, however, we should rarely expect to see such adjustments. We would
also rarely expect individuals to actually make the calculations predicted in the models.
For example, to the extent tax rates stay the same, we should never see any adjustments,
even if individuals were behaving exactly as predicted. Individuals also would not have
to make any of the calculations used in the models. Instead, individuals would merely
enter into risky positions based on after-tax payoffs. The only place we are likely see
adjustments is if tax rates change, but most rate changes may be sufficiently small and
sufficiently intertwined with other tax law changes that anecdotal evidence (as opposed to
large scale statistical studies) might miss the resulting portfolio adjustments.
There are good reasons to believe that individuals do act consistently with the
models. Individuals spend their whole life in an after-tax world. When deciding on
investments or assuming risk, people are likely to take into account the after-tax returns.
If they are not taking into account after-tax returns, they are making systematic mistakes
and can improve their risk/return payoffs. For example, if they look at pre-tax prices
rather than after-tax prices, they may have less risk than they truly desire. While we may
not believe that individuals are perfectly rational and always make the best possible
decisions, as a first cut, we should probably believe that they respond to the prices and
incentives that they face, which are the after-tax prices and incentives. If true, individuals
implicitly adjust without making the calculations predicted in the models.
Moreover, claims that individuals do not adjust need a theory explaining how
individuals do behave. The taxation and risk models are based on standard assumptions
about individual behavior, assumptions that are widely used in both the income tax and
consumption tax literatures. They merely assume that individuals respond to the after-tax
prices and risks that they face. It is not sufficient to claim that the theories are wrong
without a more plausible story of how individuals do behave. Without an alternative
theory, the standard theory may be the best we have.
Finally, it is uniformly and unquestioningly accepted that individuals would make
similar portfolio adjustments under a cash flow tax. Although the details of the
adjustments vary in an income and cash flow tax, the key ideas are the same. Moreover,
the adjustments are of approximately equal complexity. In fact, to calculate the
adjustment under a cash flow tax, individuals must be able to sum an infinite series,
which is much more difficult than the calculations under an income tax. It is hard to see
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how we distinguish the cash flow tax from the income tax case. Either scholars must
abandon the Cary Brown theorem or accept that an income tax does not tax returns to
risk.78
To summarize, I believe that our expectations or priors, in the absence of empirical
evidence, should be that individuals do respond to the incentives imposed on them
through taxation. In particular, it is likely that they enter into risky positions in light of
taxation consistent with the predictions in the literature.
The Empirical Evidence
The empirical evidence is insufficient to sway us one way or another. There are a
number of studies of the effects of taxation on portfolio choice, but none have been able
to isolate and analyze the type of adjustments considered here. Moreover, the studies
tend to suffer (through no fault of the authors) from data and conceptual problems. A
good survey of the evidence can be found in the Handbook of Public Economics,79 and
the discussion below is drawn from this survey. The bottom line result is that there is
pretty good evidence that portfolios are sensitive to tax considerations, some contrary
evidence, and, as mentioned, no evidence that is sufficiently nuanced to isolate the types
of effects considered here.
There are two problems with measuring how individuals adjust their portfolios in
response to taxation. First, few data sets include sufficient information on high-net-worth
households whose behavior is central to the studies. Household surveys based on random
78
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population samples do not have sufficient response rates among high-income or high-net
worth individuals to be reliable. Moreover, the data we do have on high-income
households is often insufficiently broken down into asset types. Second, we do not have
a good understanding of the choices individuals do make. Almost no households hold the
market portfolio, as predicted by theory. This means that asset demands in the models
must be conditioned on the set of assets a household owns, making modeling much more
difficult. A third problem not mentioned in the Handbook survey is that much of the
adjustment to changes in tax rates involves shifts to or from tax-favored assets. The
taxation and risk literature can accommodate different tax rates on different assets, so
empiricists should be able to disentangle portfolio adjustments because of the effect of
taxation and risk and adjustments because assets are tax-favored. The studies, however,
do not clearly do so.
Within these limitations, there are six studies on the effects of taxation on portfolio
choice in the U.S.80 Four of the six studies show that households adjust their portfolios in
response to taxation. The most recent and comprehensive study is by Poterba and
Samwick.81 They look at the Survey of Consumer Finance for five different years and
conclude that marginal tax rates have important effects on asset allocation decisions. On
the other side, Scholz, in 1994, concluded that the 1986 Tax Reform Act effected the
level of tax-deductible borrowing but he did not find any clear evidence of other portfolio
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shifts.82 Poterba argues that there are reasons why Scholz’s study is flawed, but at this
point, we are left debating details of the empirics and are not yet at the point where we
have clear conclusions.83
In sum, we do not yet have statistical or other evidence establishing whether
individuals adjust their portfolios because of the effect of an income tax on risk. Those
who believe that the models are likely to be true cannot yet claim empirical support. On
the other hand, skeptics must also be careful because at this point, four of six studies
show some types of adjustments are made. The “no adjustment” position, that only pretax prices matter, is unlikely to be sustained.
Conclusions from the Literature if Individuals do not Adjust
Suppose individuals fail to adjust their portfolios as predicted. We do we learn? It
probably depends on why individuals are not adjusting and how individuals are setting
their portfolios. Consider four possibilities. First, the adjustments might be too complex.
Second, trading costs might be too high. Third, individuals might be subject to framing
effects or other psychological problems that prevent them from acting the same way when
presented with identical opportunity sets. Fourth, individuals may hold unique assets,
such as small businesses, in which they cannot adjust their ownership. Assume in each
case that individuals set their portfolios according to pre-tax returns. (The conclusions
might be very different if individuals set their portfolios on some other basis. This is one
reason why claims that individuals do not adjust need a theory explaining what type of
behavior we should expect.)
Complexity. Suppose that the adjustments are simply too complex. If individuals
could figure out the proper adjustments, they would make them, but because of the
complexity of the adjustments, they fail to make them or make them incorrectly. It is not
clear why this would be so. Individuals do not have to make the calculations necessary to
translate between pre and post-taxed worlds. They merely need to decide how much risk
they desire based on after-tax returns. But suppose that this calculation is too
82
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burdensome, and it is easier for individuals to make this determination based on pre-tax
prices and returns. For example, the tax law might be sufficiently complex that
determining after-tax prices might be difficult.
One response might be that the problem stems from the complexity of current law.
If we simplified current law and moved it closer to a Haig-Simons tax, individuals could
and would adjust. The failure to adjust would then be similar to the realization rule and
other problems with current law – it would not affect our thinking about the Haig-Simons
ideal.
Suppose, however, that the adjustments are too difficult even in a Haig-Simons tax.
If this is the case, an income tax leaves individuals in a bad spot. To maximize utility, it
forces them to make portfolio adjustments but the adjustments are too hard to make.
Perhaps these individuals are blissfully ignorant. The government, through the tax
system is absorbing risk that they thought that they were taking but they do not know it.
These individuals, however blissfully ignorant when they invest, will be disappointed ex
post. They will not turn out to have the set of returns that they thought they had.
We can increase their (ex post) utility, however, by implementing a tax that is
equivalent to a Haig-Simons tax (with portfolio adjustments) but does not require
portfolio adjustments. Individuals under such a tax would not need to understand or
make the adjustments that they would want to make under a Haig-Simon tax.
For example, wealth taxes may not require adjustments in response to taxation. A
wealth tax is fixed, ex ante, before the outcomes of risky bets are known. For example,
suppose an individual has $100 and invests in our running example, an asset with a 50%
chance of being worth $130 and a 50% chance of being worth $90. A 2% wealth tax
would reduce his wealth to $98 regardless of how the bet turns out. If the risk-free rate
were 4%, the 2% wealth tax would be the same as a 50% Haig-Simons tax with portfolio
adjustments.84 No portfolio adjustments would be needed, however, because the tax does
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not nominally apply to risky returns so there is no need to adjust portfolios to offset the
nominal tax.85
If individuals cannot understand the required adjustments under an income tax, we
should think about switching to an equivalent tax that does not require individual
portfolio adjustments. The same holds for cash flow consumption taxes and wage taxes.
Much like in the case with the imperfect tax system, the model makes the link between
hypothetical systems, allowing us to make better informed policy choices.
Transactions costs. The same logic applies if transactions costs prevent individuals
from adjusting their portfolios. Like in the complexity case, there is no reason to believe
that individuals start from a pre-tax world and then buy and sell securities to adjust for
taxes. Instead, they always live in an after-tax world and probably initially purchase
securities based on the risk and returns they get in that world. Transactions costs should
not prevent individuals from setting their portfolios to eliminate the effect of the tax on
risk.86
The only place transactions costs matter is when tax rates change. For example,
suppose tax rates change rapidly from, say, 70% to around 30%, roughly the change in
rates in the Reagan years. Individuals in such circumstances would find themselves with
too much risk because the government no longer shares risk through taxation as much as
before. They would have to reduce their risk positions and transactions costs might make
this a slow process. (This is, in fact, the criticism Poterba and Samwick makes of the
Scholz study – transactions costs might slow the adjustments sufficiently that they do not
show up in the years Scholz examined.)87
To the extent we are concerned about the effect of large tax rate changes, we can set
up a system equivalent to an income tax except that it does not require adjustments when
rates change. As discussed above for complexity, we might want to consider a wealth tax
or Auerbach’s retrospective tax. Alternatively, we might want to think about ways to
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adjust tax rates that reduce the need for portfolio adjustments.88 Regardless of which
approach we take, the existence of transactions costs in slowing portfolio adjustments in
response to rate changes may increase rather than reduce the value of the taxation and risk
literature because that literature can help us think through how to set up the tax system to
reduce the utility losses due to transactions costs.
Framing. Framing effects or other psychological problems might prevent
individuals from making adjustments. Presented with identical opportunity sets framed
differently, they might perceive them to be different and behave differently. Therefore,
showing that a tax on risk-free returns and a Haig-Simons tax give individuals identical
opportunity sets is not sufficient to show that individuals will behave the same under the
two taxes.
The difficulty in analyzing this case is that we can no longer easily do welfare
analysis. Individuals would be behaving inconsistently, and we could not take their
actions in any given state of the world as reflecting their preferences. Given the same
opportunity set and different behaviors, how are we to know which the individual really
prefers?
Although there is no standard procedure in this case – behavioral economics has
remained staunchly positive to avoid this problem – one possibility is to impose a set of
rules that is least likely to be subject to the psychological quirk. That is, we would
choose a set of rules under which individual would behave in a way that is consistent with
rational behavior. A similar alternative approach is to pick a set of rules that induces
behavior that individuals are least likely regret as foolish ex post.89 For example, if there
is something particularly difficult about calculating after-tax returns from pre-tax returns
and making adjustments, we can give them an equivalent tax system that does not require
such calculations. If individuals were able to understand their framing problems, they
would act under an income tax exactly like they do under a wealth tax. We can try to
educate individuals to get around the framing effect or we can just give them the wealth
tax. Or the argument might go in the other direction, depending on how the
psychological effects enter. The key, however, is that the equivalence under rational
behavior is helpful to thinking about the problem under irrational behavior.
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For exam ple, if tax rate chan ges ap ply only to new positio ns, adjustments wou ld be unnec essary.

Neither of these approaches is without problem. Both privilege one viewp oint, rationality or ex post
regret, over another viewpoint. But given the underlying inconsistency, there is no way to m ake po licy (at least
policy that at is at least partially based on individual preferences) without doing so.
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Unique Assets. A final reason individuals might not adjust to the nominal taxation
of risky returns is that they own unique or illiquid assets and cannot purchase more than a
set amount. For example, they might have all of their wealth tied up in a closely held
business. If they cannot adjust to the nominal taxation of risky returns, the tax system
will end up absorbing some risk. What we think of this depends on why the individual
holds the unique or illiquid asset.
One reason for holding a large concentrated position in a risky asset is to limit
moral hazard problems. Holding a concentrated position in an asset may reduce incentive
problems created by moral hazard. If the tax system forces the individual to bear less risk
by absorbing both the upside and downside returns, the moral hazard problem is made
worse. The combination of the nominal tax on risk and moral hazard creates social
losses.
The other major reason for holding a large concentrated position is adverse
selection. For example, asymmetric information may prevent an individual from selling
pieces of his business. In this case, the tax system promotes welfare by allowing the
individual to partially self-insure by not adjusting his portfolio.
Which of these dominates is not clear. It is also not clear whether other
mechanisms could solve adverse selection problems without creating moral hazard
problems. If adverse selection problems are dominant and if there are no other better
methods of solving them, an ex post tax that absorbs risk may be a good solution. A cash
flow consumption or a Haig-Simons income tax would probably work equally well. In
the absence of adjustments, both would tax the return to risk-taking. Both also have
potential to create moral hazard problems. If moral hazard problems are dominant, ex
post taxes may make them worse. Ex post taxes may still be justified because of their
ability to tax inframarginal returns, but the increase in moral hazard problems would be a
cost.
Summary
In sum, the arguments about the cases where individuals do not adjust their
portfolios, to the extent they are believable, mirror the arguments where the tax system is
different from the one modeled. The models tell us something about an ideal world
which is helpful in setting policy in our less than ideal world. Claiming that individuals
do not adjust as in the models is not a claim that we can ignore the models and support
the status quo. Moreover, it is not clear that we should blindly assume individuals do not
adjust their portfolios. We assume without question that individuals would adjust under a
cash flow tax and the adjustments under a cash flow tax are essentially identical to those
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under an income tax. Individuals spend their life in an after-tax world and there no
reason to believe that they are tailoring their risks to that world.
C. The Government Doesn’t Adjust its Portfolio
Potential Problem
The taxation and risk models requires the government to adjust its portfolio by
selling securities and investing in risk-free assets. Absent this adjustment, markets may
not clear at existing prices, which means individuals may not be able to make the required
portfolio adjustments. In addition, the pattern of tax revenues will vary depending on the
tax system chosen, which defeats the equivalences.
The government portfolio position is complex. The Federal government has vast
positions in land, indirect positions in the housing market through government
guarantees, in the labor market through unemployment insurance, in the medical market
through Medicare, and (short positions) in the debt market through its borrowing.
Nevertheless, casual observation suggests that the government does not appear to behave
as required in the models. Although we cannot be sure of the reasons, the most plausible
reason is that we do not want the government either directly owning or selling short large
numbers of securities (as opposed to having an indirect stake in them through the tax
system). The government would become the dominant market participant and we might,
for example, be concerned about how it would use this influence.90
This section considers how views about government portfolio behavior should
affect the conclusions from the model.91 Before turning to that discussion, note that the
problem of government adjustments is exactly the same in a Haig-Simons income tax and
a cash flow consumption tax. In both cases, government portfolio adjustments are needed
for the basic equivalences (such as a cash flow tax being equal to a zero tax) to hold. The
discussion of government portfolio adjustments, therefore, cannot help distinguish
between income and consumption taxes – arguments that the taxation and risk literature
for income tax is not correct because of the lack of government portfolio adjustments
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One has to be careful in making this argument. The combinatio n of the government portfolio
adjustment and the tax system makes the government indifferent to market performance. An objec tion to
government portfolio adjustments would have to argue that government exposure to the market, which is what
it gets when it imposes an income tax and does not make portfolio adjustments, is appropriate.
91

The only other author to discuss government portfolio adjustments is Kaplow, note 3. M uch of the
discussion here follows from his analysis and from his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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would apply equally to the Cary Brown theorem for cash flow taxes. Instead, the
discussion distinguishes between taxes nominally imposed on risk, where individuals
must adjust their portfolios and taxes not nominally on risk.92
The existence or non-existence of government portfolio adjustments, therefore, will
not alter many of the ultimate conclusions of the taxation and risk literature. The
difference between income and consumption taxes will still be the risk-free rate of return.
Other conclusions, however, might change. For example, the deadweight loss from
mismeasurements or the problems with inflation might be different if there are no
government adjustments.
The necessity of some type of adjustment
Although casual observation suggests that the government does not make portfolio
adjustments, there are good reasons to believe that in fact it does and must make
adjustments. To see this, suppose that there is a tax regime, a corresponding set of
government portfolio positions (which could be not having any explicit portfolio), and a
set of spending programs. Suppose also that the government budget with this regime is in
long-term balance. Borrowing can shift tax receipts across periods, but in the long run,
government inflows must equal outlays. For example, if taxes are low, say because the
economy is doing poorly, the government must either raise taxes or cut spending.
Now suppose that the tax regime is changed but nothing else changes. Because the
tax regime has changed, in some states the world, the new tax regime will bring in more
money than the old regime and in some states, the new tax regime will bring in less. This
means that the government budget is no longer in balance. Because the government
budget must be in long-term balance, this state of affairs is not an equilibrium. If the new
tax regime is to remain and if spending is to remain fixed, the government must adjust its
portfolio to maintain budget balance. A pure “no adjustment” position is unsustainable.

92

For example, government portfolio adjustments might affect views of so-called “prepaid” savings
acco unts and post-paid savings accounts. In a pre-paid savings account, such as the current law “Roth IR A,”
individuals may no t deduct contributio ns but no tax is p aid on withdra wals – the nontaxation of capital is
explicit. In post-paid accounts, such as traditional IRA’s, individuals may deduct contributions but are taxed
on withdrawals. Post-paid accounts are effectively cash-flow taxation and require portfolio adjustments. Prepaid accounts do not require portfolio adjustments. For a discussion of pre-paid and post-paid systems, see
David F. Bradford and the U.S. Treasury Tax Policy Staff. Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, (2d. ed., revised,
198 4).
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Borrowing should not change this result. The government can borrow to smooth
spending across states of nature but ultimately, any borrowing reflects the risky returns in
the tax system. For example, suppose that in Tax Regime 1, the government receives $1
in each period and that in Tax Regime 2, the government receives either $0 or $2 in each
period, depending on the performance of risky assets. The government can borrow in Tax
Regime 2 when taxes are $0 to even out its cash flows. The borrowing, however, would
be equivalent to selling the risky asset short. The reason why is that the borrower only
gets paid off if next period taxes are $2. The debt is entirely dependent on risky flows. It
is effectively equity that the government has sold short, just as the model requires. If the
underlying flows are risky, borrowing will be risky. 93 Borrowing, therefore, cannot
change the basic equivalences and the need for some type of adjustments when tax
regimes change.
Conclusions if the government does not adjust its portfolio
This analysis suggests that the government would have to adjust its portfolio after a
significant tax change, (or alternatively, change spending to correspond to the tax
change). The central question then is how an argument that governments must adjust
their portfolio can be reconciled with the casual (and likely correct) observation that our
current government does not seem to make the adjustment predicted by the models.94
The answer is that the models only require the government to adjust its portfolio if
it changes tax regimes. Thus, the models would predict that if we switched to, say, a
wage tax, the government would have to purchase equities to offset the reduction in
equity exposure it has under current law through the income tax (or change its spending
patterns). Nothing in the models requires it to take a particular portfolio position under a
given tax system. Instead, the models merely show equivalences of different tax systems
with government portfolio adjustments.95
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The borrowing fully reflects the riskiness of the underlying flows because, by assumption,
government spending was held constant across tax regimes. The governm ent cannot, for exam ple, sell assets
to pay off the bo rrowing.
The government could attem pt to pay off the debt by printing money, but the resulting inflation would
be equivalent to a tax change, which breaks down the equivalence.
94

As no ted, actually determining the governm ent po rtfolio is not easy. The government po rtfolio is
very complex and casual obse rvation may no t be sufficient to determine ho w it behaves.
95

For example, the mod el in Kaplow note 3, doe s not require the government to start with any
particular po rtfolio. Instead, it me rely shows the equivalence of tax regimes with a po rtfolio shift.
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For example, we might not see the government selling assets short because the
government’s preferred position might be to have the equity exposure that comes with an
income tax. Only if we switched to a tax that did not give this equity expose, such as a
wealth tax or a wage tax, we would expect to see government adjustments. Thus, the lack
of observable adjustments does not destroy the basic equivalences. Instead, it merely
shows what the government’s preferred position is.
We can see this point more formally with simple algebra. The models show that a
Haig-Simons income tax with the proper portfolio adjustments is equivalent to a tax on
the risk-free rate of return or a wealth tax:
Income tax + government adjustments = wealth tax
By rearranging the equation, we can see that a Haig-Simons tax without portfolio
adjustments (as hypothesized) is equivalent to a wealth tax with the opposite adjustments
(borrowing money to purchase equity positions):
Income tax = wealth tax - government adjustments
Thus, we can consider the failure of the government to adjust under an income tax by
selling risky assets as the equivalent as a decision to impose a wealth tax and purchasing
risky assets. We would predict that if spending patterns were held constant, if the
government shifted to a wealth tax it would have to purchase risky assets.
An equivalent approach is to consider the effect of changing tax regimes under the
assumption that the government will not adjust its portfolio. The advantage of this
approach is that it does not require assumptions about current government portfolio
policy. Instead, one need only believe that whatever the policy, it would not change with
a tax law change. Suppose, then, that the government is going to switch from an income
tax to a wealth tax. Such a switch is identical to a switch in government portfolio policy.
To see this, rearrange the equation:
Wealth tax - Income tax = Portfolio adjustments
That is, the difference between a wealth tax and an income tax is simply the government
portfolio adjustments. Government portfolio adjustments can be a perfect substitute for
major changes in tax regimes. Therefore, a decision to change the tax base between an
income and wealth should be made on the same arguments one would make to argue for a
change in government portfolio policy. Leaving aside administrative costs, the decision
is not a tax decision, it is a government portfolio decision.
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We can take this still one step further. Suppose that we restrict direct government
portfolio policy for a nontax reason. For example, we might be concerned about the
government directly owning or shorting securities. Moreover, there may be good reasons
that some securities, such as ownership interests in small businesses are not tradeable so
that the government cannot buy or sell these securities directly in the market. If true, we
can view the choice between equivalent tax policies as a method if indirectly choosing
government portfolio policies that cannot be chosen directly. For example, the choice of
an income tax over a wealth tax is a choice that the government should have an equity
stake in the markets. A choice of a wealth tax instead of an income tax is a choice that it
should not.
The same arguments apply to the choice of forms of consumption taxes. Cash flow
consumption taxes with government portfolio taxes impose a zero rate of tax on capital
income. Therefore, they are equivalent to wage taxes.
Cash flow tax + Portfolio adjustments = Wage tax
Rearranging the equation, as above, shows that in the absence of direct portfolio
adjustments by the government, the choice between cash flow taxes and wage taxes can
be thought of as choice of government portfolios. A cash flow tax without adjustments is
equivalent to imposing a wage tax and borrowing to purchase equity. 96
The failure of the government to adjust its portfolio, therefore has some effect on
the conclusions. If the government cannot adjust its portfolio, there might be grounds for
picking between equivalent tax policies other than pure administrative costs. But the core
conclusions remain. In particular, the failure of the government to adjust its portfolio has
no effect on the conclusions regarding the choice between and income tax and a
consumption tax.
IV.

Conclusion

Understanding how or whether income taxes tax returns to risk should have
dramatic effects on our understanding of tax systems. It has the potential to overturn
what were once thought to be deep philosophical arguments about an important problem.
We cannot claim to fully understand income and consumption taxes without coming to
grips with this literature.
96

This conclusion can be found in the literature describing a cash flow tax as a form of mandatory
government partnership in all projects. See [cites]. Herwig Schlunk makes a similar argument in the context
of an income tax. See Herwig Schlunk, The Cashless Corporate Tax, 55 T ax L. Rev. 1 (2001).
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The models of taxation and risk are highly simplified abstractions of the actual tax
system and of individual behavior. I have argued that here that this does not change the
core value of the models. Arguments about tax systems are often about ideals and the
models teach us about these ideals. Those who argue for an income tax usually hold the
Haig-Simons tax is an ideal, unreachable because of administrative costs, but an ideal
nonetheless. The models tell us that this ideal may not tax the things we thought it did.
Notwithstanding their value as they are, the models can be further developed.
Obviously, we can make them better track current law. Doing so would help in
understanding how current law deviates from the ideal and would, in a sense, be a
separate undertaking from the uses of the models discussed here.
Even as models of ideal systems, however, the models can be refined. For
example, current models generally only use two periods. It is not obvious how they apply
to taxes that are imposed periodically, as existing and Haig-Simons taxes do.97 Current
models also do not take into account uncertainty about future tax rates. We do not
understand how individuals would set their portfolios of take this risk into account.
Finally, we might ask why, if the models are right, do people seem to care so much
about taxes. Tax shelters are a big business. Taxes, and particular, the taxation of the
wealthy, is a major political topic. The models would seem to suggest that this emphasis
is wrong – taxes on wealth matter very little.
There might be several reasons. For example, current law may impose significant
burdens that an ideal income tax would not. Merely complying with current law is
difficult. Loss restrictions and non-neutral tax rates create incentives, and sometimes the
need, to engage in tax planning. In addition, there may be transition effects from tax rate
changes. Those who hold assets when rates go down may reap windfalls. Advocating for
tax changes may be a way of advocating for such windfalls. The taxation and risk
models, in their present form, do not help analyze these issues and further refinement of
the models would be helpful.
These topics and others need to be better understood. We cannot yet say that the
effects of taxation on risk taking, even under a perfect Haig-Simons tax, are known.
Nevertheless, existing models provide substantial insights into the nature of Haig-Simons
tax systems, wealth taxes, and consumption taxes. This is true notwithstanding that they

97

See David W eisbach, Periodic Inco me and W ealth Taxes, manuscript, for an initial exploration of
these issues.
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assume a simple, idealized tax system and rational individuals responding to the
incentives such a system imposes.
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